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In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC, and raised the ire of 
commentators around the country. The President even criticized the ruling during the 
State of the Union Address. But corporate political speech has existed at various levels 
throughout history, and the debate is often clouded by complex balancing tests and 
convoluted reasoning.  
In this dissertation, the methodology of law and economics is utilized to analyze 
the value of corporate political speech to the marketplace of ideas. Chapter 1 introduces 
Tracing the history of Supreme Court decisions dealing with corporate political speech, 
variables can be isolated that deal with each component of speech in the marketplace, the 
speech itself (the product), the speaker (the producer), and the audience (the consumers).  
The stated goal of the marketplace of ideas is to allow citizens to process 
information and arrive at efficient and true conclusions. Any regulation of corporate 
political speech must determine if the regulation prevents a high probability of harm in 
order to justify the loss of speech that may be valuable to the marketplace. Extending a 
formula first created by Judge Richard Posner, and accounting for new insights to 
decision making offered by studies in behavioral law and economics, each variable can 
be analyzed to determine when suppression is justified, and what actual factors should be 
considered by lawmakers and judges.  
The conclusion is that the high legal error costs associated with attempting to 
suppress only that speech which can consistently be deemed to be harmful make most 
	   iii	  
efforts at restricting corporate political speech problematic. In all three instances 
regulations are likely to be over-inclusive and result in a chilling effect that will impact 
core political speech at the heart of the protections of the First Amendment.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The 2012 election is estimated to have cost around $6 billion.1 This is roughly 
$700 million more than the previous high.2 One difference between 2012 and past 
elections was the changes in campaign finance laws brought about by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC in 2010.3 Citizens United, and subsequent 
decisions based on its holding, were estimated to have legalized $1.3 billion in outside 
independent expenditures, which is election spending that is not coordinated with a 
particular candidate.4  
Many citizens were united by the decision, united in the belief that this level of 
political spending was problematic.5 Grass-roots efforts by social groups started that 
aimed to bring attention to the problem of money in politics, advocating legislation, 
regulation, and even Constitutional Amendments.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matea Gold, 2012 Campaign Set to Cost a Record $6 Billion, L.A. Times, October 31, 
2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/31/news/la-pn-2012-campaign-costs-6-billion-
20121031 
2 Id.  
3 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
4 Lindsay Young, Outside Spenders Return on Investment, Sunlight Foundation, Dec. 17, 
2012, http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/return_on_investment/ 
5 Dan Eggan, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign 
Financing, Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-
16/politics/36773318_1_corporations-unions-new-limits 
6 See infra n.614 and accompanying text. 
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One of the primary complaints about the Citizens United decision was that it 
extended First Amendment protection to corporations when the corporation spent money 
on political advertising.7 This offended those who felt that the protections of the 
Constitution were intended for natural persons, and concerned those who felt that 
corporation’s deep pockets would dominate the political arena and drown out the voices 
of other speakers in an attempt to curry favor with politicians and ensure corporate 
friendly election results.8 
Although it seems clear that the new campaign finance landscape created by the 
Citizens United decision increased overall campaign spending, it is less clear if it opened 
the floodgates for spending by corporations rather than natural persons. Most experts who 
have attempted to estimate the source of political spending have admitted that it is not 
possible to determine what percentage of spending came from corporations.9 At least one 
estimate found by watchdog groups estimated that corporations contributed $75 million 
to political action committees (Super PACs).10 Considering Super PACs are estimated to 
have spent just under $700 million, it does not seem that corporations were the largest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Harry Bradford, Americans Disagree With Mitt Romney: Corporations Aren't People, 
Huffington Post, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/corporations-
are-people-argument-rejected-most-americans_n_1228301.html 
8 See e.g. Move to Amend, https://movetoamend.org/ 
9 Eduardo Porter, Get What You Pay For? Not Always, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/business/pitfalls-of-spending-on-
politics.html?pagewanted=all 
10 Michael Beckel and Reity O'Brien, Mystery Firm is Election’s Top Corporate Donor at 
$5.3 Million, Open Secrets Blog, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-
firm-is-elections-top-corpo.html (Combined effort of Center for Public Integrity and 
Center for Responsive Politics) 
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driver of the increase in spending.11 In fact, at least one individual is estimated to have 
spent almost twice that much on his own.12  
Some feel this number is likely to be a low estimate, because of the incentives 
corporations may have not to disclose donations and laws that currently leave several 
avenues for corporations to donate without disclosure.13 However, others have argued 
that corporations are actually unlikely to become major political spenders, because 
alienating potential customers is almost always bad for business and remaining neutral 
seems the safest plan of action.14 
Regardless of whether the fear of the influence of corporate spending on the 
democratic process is justified, the Citizens United decision placed the First Amendment 
rights of corporations on the front page, and the question of whether the Supreme Court 
should fully protect corporate political speech is an important one. In this dissertation, I 
attempt to use the economic methodology developed by Judge Richard Posner and others 
to analyze the costs and benefits of regulating corporate political speech.  
Posner and other law and economics scholars have argued that economic models 
and concepts can be illuminating for legal analysis, even outside of traditionally market 
driven activities.15 Given that the First Amendment protection has long been tied to the 
analogy of a “marketplace of ideas”, Posner and others have attempted to use market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Id. 
12 Peter H. Jones, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More On Campaign Than Previously 
Known, Huffington Post, Dec. 3, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-
election_n_2223589.html  
13 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending, 101 Geo. L.J. 923 (2013). 
14 Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big 
Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 639 (2011) 
15 See infra n.381-415 and accompanying text. 
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concepts to enhance our understanding of the tradeoffs involved in First Amendment 
decisions.16   
In this dissertation, I apply this analytic framework to corporate political speech 
for the first time. Additionally, I enhance the framework by incorporating the legitimate 
concerns and criticisms raised by the behavioral law and economics movement, concerns 
about the way traditional economic modeling has failed to reflect the process of actual 
human decision making. I take these considerations seriously, and where appropriate, 
incorporate them into the traditional law and economics model as developed by Posner.  
Decisions about the protections of the First Amendment and regulations that 
suppress speech are always of significant interest to both professionals and scholars in the 
fields of Journalism and Public Relations. In addition to the natural interest Journalism 
and Mass Communication scholars have in all aspects of the First Amendment, corporate 
political speech is of additional interest for several reasons. First, there is the economic 
impact of the loosening of the regulations on media companies, with the increased money 
largely spent on television and radio advertising. Second, there is the role the press will 
play to hold politicians and corporations accountable for any spending that gives rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.  
But the most significant impact may be the concern that any future regulation of 
corporate political speech could include media companies and impact the ability of the 
traditional media to comment on political activity. Past regulation, including the 
regulation challenged in Citizens United, exempted media companies from restrictions on 
corporate political speech. But if future challenges were aimed at the extension of First 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See infra n.416-429 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment rights to corporations generally, legislators would need to be sure to 
continue to carve out exemptions for the press. This could prove more challenging than it 
has in the past. Technological advancements and new media have changed the concept of 
the “press”, and have proved a challenge for both the courts and legislators to define. The 
argument has been raised that there is no special exemption for the traditional press 
companies under the Freedom of the Press language of the First Amendment. For this 
reason, the standing of corporate political speech is an important aspect of mass 
communications law. 
Looking at corporate political speech through the framework of the “marketplace 
of ideas”, I will be able to isolate the many and diverse variables the Supreme Court has 
considered in the long line of cases that considered independent expenditures and 
corporate political speech. By isolating the variables and analyzing them in the market 
model, I can simplify and clarify exactly what is at stake when deciding whether or not to 
suppress political speech by corporations and what harms may result from protecting it. 
This can help to clarify what has become a convoluted and confusing debate. Many of the 
arguments raised about the regulation of corporate political speech currently are focused 
on the emotional concerns about the role of corporations in politics or the theoretical 
concerns about the way corporate political speech will impact elections. Several focus on 
questions that the courts have long settled, like whether money can be equated with 
speech or whether First Amendment protection is extended to corporations. Most of these 
oversimplify or misunderstand the extensive case law and the important balancing that 
courts must engage in when determining whether to suppress speech in the name of 
protecting society. Applying a law and economics framework helps to highlight the real 
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tradeoffs present in any such regulation and the impact of speech regulations at every 
level of the marketplace of ideas. This exercise is valuable in two ways; it highlights the 
risk of legal error involved in regulations of corporate political speech and helps focus on 
possible ways to mitigate said error that could either create new ways of justifying such 
regulation or allow opponents to anticipate and defend the value of the speech.	  Second, it 
extends the application of the law and economics framework to a significant area of 
speech where it has not previously been applied and allows for a better understanding of 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Political Speech and the First Amendment 
This chapter discusses the First Amendment protection afforded to corporations 
by the courts throughout history. It begins with an overview of corporate rights under the 
constitution generally, and then discusses the historical theories of corporate identity that 
have influenced both the courts and commentators when deciding whether the protections 
of the constitution, including the First Amendment, should extend to corporations. 
The Constitutional Rights of Corporations 
	  
A threshold question to the issue of whether corporations have First Amendment 
rights that would limit the ability of the government to regulate corporate political 
speech, is whether the protections of the First Amendment, or any of the other 
amendments of the Bill of Rights extend to corporations. There are two different ways of 
addressing this question. The first is practical, to trace the history of the protection of the 
rights of corporations in the courts. The second is more philosophical: to examine exactly 
how corporations are viewed by the court and by society, and what status they hold under 
the law. The two cannot be neatly separated, because the second question has often, been 
considered in decisions that determine the constitutional rights of corporations.  
	   8	  
The legal standing of a corporation is not central to the determination of the 
proper balance to bring to corporate First Amendment rights in the area of corporate 
political speech. Although some of the reaction to Citizen’s United has involved activists 
who seek to end the treatment of corporation’s as “people” for purposes of constitutional 
protection,17 virtually all corporate First Amendment cases have focused on the value of 
the speech itself and the rights of the listeners.18  
However, it is instructive to discuss the debate about the status of corporations in 
order to understand the struggle of the courts and commentators to determine the proper 
understanding of a corporation, and because arguments about the special status of 
corporations and the role of the state in the creation of corporations arise up in the 
corporate political speech cases, and they mirror some of the debate about the conception 
of a corporation. 
Early corporations were chartered by English authorities and there is little 
evidence that they had rights beyond the language of their charter.19 At the time of the 
establishment of the Constitution, there were few corporations in the colonies and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: 
An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of 
Corporations, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 209 (2011).  
18 Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 Seattle 
U. L. Rev. 863 (2007), pointing out that none of the corporate First Amendment cases 
rely on Santa Clara. “Moreover, to the extent the Court has recognized First Amendment 
rights of corporations, corporate personhood was not central to those decisions. The 
Court was more inclined to rest the argument for corporate speech on the right of 
listeners, for whom the underlying information would be useful.” 
19 Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 225 (2011) 
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corporate speech was a relatively foreign concept.20 Early charters retained much of the 
control exercised by the Crown prior to the Revolutionary War,21 even as the number of 
U.S. corporations grew rapidly.22  
An early 19th century Supreme Court case previewed the difficulty the Court 
would have deciding what rights to extend to corporations. Dartmouth College v. 
Woodword,23 decided in 1819, protected the corporate right to contract, while 
simultaneously distinguishing a corporation from a person. In his opinion, Chief Justice 
John Marshall said, “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.”24 This statement would become the underpinning for the 
Artificial Entity theory of the corporation discussed later in this dissertation. However, in 
the same case, Chief Justice Marshall also said that there was a limit to the power of the 
state to restrict corporations, and ruled in favor of Dartmouth College.  “Corporations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 863 (2007), citing Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business 
Corporations Before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449, 450 (1903). 
21 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 284 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) 
(“The powers of corporations are defined, and operate on limited objects. Their power 
originates by the authority of the legislature, and can be destroyed by the same 
authority.”). 
22 See, Winkler, infra note 2. “Corporations grew rapidly in the immediate aftermath of 
the American Revolution, with estimates of approximately 350 business corporations 
formed between 1783 and 1801.” Citing Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origin of the 
American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 4 (1945). 
23 17 U.S. 518 (1819) 
24 Id. at 636 
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receive constitutional protection, as Dartmouth College did, in order to protect the 
constitutional rights of the individuals behind the artificial entity.”25 
The 14th Amendment, ratified by the states in 1868, guaranteed due process and 
equal protection to citizens. There is little evidence that the authors’ specifically intended 
the protections to extend to corporations, but it also did not explicitly exclude them.26 Yet 
in 1886, the Supreme Court declared in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
that corporations were protected by the 14th Amendment.27 What’s more, the Court 
asserted this without argument or discussion. The key language, which endures to this 
day, was not a part of the written opinion, but was an oral statement by Chief Justice 
Morrison Waite prior to oral argument. “The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids 
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.”28 Some 
commentators point to this decision as putting corporations on the same plane as 
individuals for purposes of constitutional protection.29 But others felt the case did not 
intend to protect corporations from regulation.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Winkler, infra note 2 at 864. 
26 Id. at 865. Winkler discusses the so-called “Conspiracy Theory” that arose when Rosco 
Conkling, one of the members of the congressional committee that drafted the 
Amendment argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of a railroad company that the 
drafters intended to include corporations. According to Winkler and others, no 
independent evidence for this exists. See Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Court, The 
Corporation, and Conkling, 46 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1940). 
27 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
28 Id. The statement was included in the opinion by the court reporter.  
29 See THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE 
AND THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5-6 (2002). Regardless of whether it put corporations 
on equal footing for Constitutional protection generally, it certainly impacted the use of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment passed with the aim of protecting 
	   11	  
Whatever the intent of the Court, future decisions would extend the protection of 
the Constitution to corporations in some cases, but not in others. The most notable 
exception to the protection may be the inability to claim a right against self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment.31 There have been examples as well of courts allowing 
limitations on the right to contract for corporations that would not be acceptable for 
individuals.32 
Corporations have been accorded several protections that are equal to those of 
natural citizens, usually without significant controversy. A corporation may sue in federal 
courts under diversity jurisdiction.33 A corporation is secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures34 and from the risks of double jeopardy.35 A corporation also has the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emancipated slaves. For the first fifty years after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, more than fifty percent of the Supreme Court cases applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment involved corporations, and less than one half of one percent involved race 
discrimination claims. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 at 
90 (1938). 
30 See Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 71 (1992) 
31 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
32 See, e.g., Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906). Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn 
McCarthy, So What If Corporations Aren't People?, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2011) 
citing Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 
Geo. L.J. 1593,1646 
33 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91 (1809)  
(jurisdiction is determined by the “real persons” coming to court under the corporate 
name). 
34 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)  (overly broad subpoena for production of 
corporate records constituted unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Fourth 
Amendment) 
35 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977)  (acquittal of 
corporation is not appealable because of Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy). 
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trial by jury.36 It is clear that corporations currently enjoy many of the same protections 
as individuals, but that the treatment of the two parties is not identical. 
Theories of the Corporation 
	  
Theories of the corporation reflect the thinking of judges and legal scholars as to 
what practical identity a corporation has under the law. Practically, a corporation is a 
collection of individuals, but as seen below, it takes on unique qualities that distinguish it 
from other organizations and groups including, most significantly, perpetual life and 
separation of ownership and control. These differences have given rise to several 
different theories of the corporation over the country’s history.  
The first theory of the corporation was the concession theory, or the artificial 
person theory.37 This theory, inherited from the British tradition, held that corporations 
existed purely as creations of the state through the granting of their charters, and the 
corporation thus had only those powers and rights afforded to it through the state grant.38 
According to Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College, “A corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it . . . .”.39  
From the beginning, legal authority of the government to grant charters created 
problems, including concerns about bribery, political favoritism and the creation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970). 
37 Ripken, supra note 17 218-219 (2011) 
38 William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1989) 
39 17 U.S. 518 (1819) 
	   13	  
monopolies.40 General corporation statutes proliferated throughout the states in an 
attempt to streamline the process and ensure access to the corporate from for everyone.41 
As the chartering of corporations became less restrictive, the theory of the corporation as 
an artificial person that existed at the concession of the state seemed less appropriate.42  
Two theories emerged to replace the concession theory. One took the opposite 
approach to the concession theory, seeing the corporation not as a separate legal entity, 
but as a collection or aggregate of the individuals who fromed the corporation. Under this 
aggregate theory, “the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the 
rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”43 This 
theory sought to explicitly state what might seem obvious but can be obscured by other 
theories, corporations cannot be fromed, cannot exist, and certainly cannot act without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ripken, supra note 17 at 220. 
41 Bratton, supra note 38 at 1485. 
42 Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2011) “As the structure of corporations changed and became 
more management controlled, corporations began to be viewed as no longer representing 
the rights of the individuals who composed them, but rather, as separate bodies that 
possessed their own values and desires independent of their shareholders”, Ripken, supra 
note 17. “The act of incorporation with the state thus became merely a formality of filing 
and played little role in the personhood of corporations. The idea that corporations 
existed only because of the concession of the state held far less force and was replaced 
with the belief that the corporation actually owed its existence to the individuals who 
formed the corporation to conduct their business”, and Bratton, supra note 38 “The 
proliferation of general corporation laws necessitated adjustments in the underlying 
theory of the firm. 
The “legal fiction” and “artificial entity” notions were questioned because new statutes 
impaired their base in concession theory. With equal access to the form assured, 
corporations no longer seemed a product of sovereign grace. Although many still saw a 
reified corporate entity, widespread use of the corporate form directed attention away 
from juridical constructs and toward the social reality of the business and the creative 
energy of the individuals conducting it.” 
43 Ripken, supra note 1, at 221, citing  1 Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of 
Private Corporations 1-2 (2d ed. 1886) (stating that it is “self-evident that a corporation is 
not in reality a person or a thing distinct from its constituent parts. The word 
‘corporation’ is but a collective name for the corporators or members who compose [it].”) 
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the agreement and participation of individuals, both as principals and as agents. Because, 
under this theory, the natural persons who make up the corporation are in fact the 
corporate person, there is no separate identity. This theory was consistent with the legal 
status of partnerships.44  
Language in the Santa Clara case implies that it is this theory, and not a more 
explicit from of corporate personhood, that provided the underlying rationale for the 
Santa Clara decision, and the Court’s ruling that a corporation was a person for purposes 
of the 14th Amendment and could not be taxed differently from an individual.45 “To 
deprive the corporation of its property . . . is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their 
property . . . . [T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation 
to the persons who compose it, and protect them . . . .”46 
As corporations grew, however, it became harder to analogize them to a collection 
of individuals. As more control of the corporation was handed over to managers by 
shareholders or directors, the natural persons exercising the rights of the corporation were 
rarely the same individuals whose own rights had been seen as extending to the 
corporation under the aggregate theory.47  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Horwitz, supra note 30, at 75. “In reaction to the grant theory, some legal writers 
during the 1880s began to put forth a polar opposite conception of the corporation as a 
creature of free contract among individual shareholders, no different, in effect, from a 
partnership. 
45 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory , 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 
173, 176 (1985). 
46 Ripken, supra note 1, citing The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747-48,  appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885) ; see 
also Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 404-05 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) , aff'd, 118 
U.S. 394 (1886)  (explaining how corporations are groups of associated people that are 
entitled to the same constitutional protections as individual persons). 
47 See Bratton, supra, note 38 at 1486. “The classical economic model did not offer a 
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The alternative theory attempted to recognize the difference between the 
collection of the individuals, and the corporation itself. This natural entity (or real entity) 
theory, considered the corporation a legal entity with characteristics distinct from the 
underlying shareholders who had created or owned the firm.48 The disconnect between 
the shareholders and the managers, and the difficulty of ascribing actions taken by 
majority rule to all shareholders equally, made a separate corporate legal identity 
appealing.49 Founded in European ideas of corporate realism, this theory held that “[t]he 
corporate entity was real, and group dynamics were more significant than individual 
contributions.”50  
Many scholars have argued that Citizens United was a victory for the natural 
entity theory. However, much of the debate over which theory of the corporation is most 
appropriate was abandoned in the 1920’s, when John Dewey wrote several critiques of 
the attempts to distinguish the theories and determined that they could be used 
interchangeably to argue either for or against corporate rights and government corporate 
control.51 Dewey preferred a practical view of corporations, and quoted favorably 
Frederic Maitland’s definition: 
The corporation is (forgive this compound adjective) a right-and-duty-
bearing unit. Not all the legal propositions that are true of a man will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
solution for this conflict. It assumed that profit-maximizing, individual entrepreneurs 
both owned the means of production and directed production. With the railroads, this 
basic assumption no longer obtained: Groups of managers and investors, rather than 
individual actors, became the players. Furthermore, their interests came into conflict as 
ownership and direction of the means of production began to separate.” 
48 E. Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations (Univ. of Chicago Press 1897). 
49 Horwitz, supra note 30, at 89. “a theory of a separate corporate entity, ‘imput[ing]’ to 
the corporation the ‘will’ of the shareholders”.  
50 See Bratton, supra, note 38 at 1491.  
51 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 
655 
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true of a corporation. For example, it can neither marry nor be given in 
marriage; but in a vast number of cases you can make a legal statement 
about x and y which will hold good whether these symbols stand for two 
men or for two corporations, or for a corporation and a man.”52 
 
For Dewey, the debate about the existence of a real or fictitious corporate 
personality was unnecessary.  
In saying that “person” might legally mean whatever the law makes it 
mean, I am trying to say that “person” might be used simply as a synonym 
for a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Any such unit would be a person; such a 
statement would be truistic, tautological. Hence it would convey no 
implications, except that the unit has those rights and duties which the 
courts find it to have. What “person” signifies in popular speech, or in 
psychology, or in philosophy or morals, would be as irrelevant, to employ 
an exaggerated simile, as it would be to argue that because a wine is called 
“dry,” it has the properties of dry solids; or that, because it does not have 
those properties, wine cannot possibly be “dry.”53 
 
Dewey may not have settled the debate about the legal status of corporations,54 
but he did quiet the philosophical debate about how the courts and society should think 
about the question of corporate identity.  
Corporate Political Speech and the First Amendment 
	  
Corporate influence in the political process did not take substantial root until the 
middle of the 19th century. With the growth of political parties and the subsequent need to 
raise large sums of money to finance political campaigns, by the time of Abraham 
Lincoln’s second campaign for the presidency, corporations had become “an integral part 
of campaign financing, since government contracts provided so large a source of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 3 The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland 304, 307 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 
1911). 
53 Dewey, supra note 51, at 656. 
54 See Horowitz, supra note 45, arguing that Dewey’s assertion of indeterminacy is 
incorrect because real entity theory is particularly problematic when looking at 
management driven corporations.  
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income.”55 This caused Lincoln to complain that “[as] a result of the war, corporations 
have become enthroned, and an era of corruption in high places will follow.”56 
The pace of corporate expenditures for public-issue campaigns and corporate 
contributions to candidates accelerated during succeeding administrations as industrialists 
built systems of manufacturing and mass transportation. Although there had been some 
efforts at electoral refrom at the state level in the late 1800s, Congress was not moved to 
action until financial transactions by major insurance companies in support of candidates 
and parties favorable to their activities created public controversy during the first 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt.57 Congress responded to Roosevelt’s subsequent 
challenge to ban all corporate contributions to political committees and campaigns with 
the Tillman Act of 190758 that disallowed contributions by federally chartered 
corporations.  
The law actually accomplished little refrom, however, because it applied to only a 
small fraction of corporations and was easily circumvented by contributions in kind. 
Nonetheless, the Tillman Act and the subsequent 1910 Publicity Act59 that required donor 
disclosure of large contributions (amended in 1911 to limit Senate and House candidates’ 
expenditures) were the opening salvoes in what was to become an ongoing battle between 
those who support corporate contributions and expenditures for political purposes, on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Money Men: The Real Story of Fund-raising's Influence on 
Political Power in America 25-26 (Crown 2000). 
56 Id. at 26. 
57 See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 
1247 (1999). 
58 Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
59 Publicity of Political Contributions Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910). 
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one hand, and those who believe that such corporate activities encourage the corruption 
of the political process, on the other.   
 The next major attempt at the federal level to limit what some saw as the injurious 
effects of corporate political spending came in 1925 with the passage of the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).60  The FCPA tightened the reporting requirements of the 
earlier laws as well as setting new candidate-spending limits. The statute included 
restrictions on expenditures as well as contributions, but was generally interpreted to 
apply only to expenditures made in concert with a campaign. The Act proved toothless, 
however, because Congress failed to include any provisions for actually enforcing the 
law.61 Corporate contributions and expenditures in support of public issues and political 
candidates continued unabated. 
Subsequent campaign finance refrom efforts included the Hatch Act in 193962 that 
was designed to limit political contributions by federal civil service workers. 
Additionally, the Smith-Connally Act,63 enacted in 1943, banned contributions to 
political campaigns by labor unions during World War II. Unions often evaded the Act, 
however, through the simple device of expending union funds independent of any 
specific campaigns but were, nonetheless, intended to help elect favorable candidates.  
  The 1946 Taft-Hartley Act64 attempted to close this loophole by banning “all 
union expenditures on political activity, including … indirect expenditure of funds to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 69-20, §§248-56, 44 Stat. 15. 
61 Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (1999).  
62 Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939). 
63 War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Act), ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). 
64 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 
61 Stat. 159. 
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help candidates,”65 the first time such a refrom tactic had been tried. Immediately 
challenged in the courts by the unions, the case eventually reached the Supreme Court.  
The Court held that the law did not apply to union activities designed primarily to infrom 
union members about political issues or where political candidates stood on such issues.66  
A subsequent 1957 case67 involving government challenges to union political 
expenditures of a more general nature resulted in an eventual victory for the unions on 
the facts presented to the jury after the case was returned for trial by the Court.  
  Much discussion of problems related to the growing costs of elections and the 
concomitant need to raise large amounts of money from organizations and wealthy 
individuals continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, no major legislative 
efforts to rein in this process survived to actually become law.  
At this point, the primary reason for wishing to limit political contributions and 
expenditures was the fear, often legitimate, of the quid pro quo of such financial 
transactions between donors and donees. There was virtually no advancement of the idea 
that such activities could or should be curtailed based on the possibility that direct 
contributions or independent expenditures would drown out the voices of those with less 
money or fewer resources to give. 
This began to change in the late 1950s, however, as the broadcast media allowed 
candidates to bypass the party apparatus and speak directly to the electorate. Although 
effective, such tactics exponentially raised the costs of campaigns, particularly at the 
statewide and national levels. In the late 1960s, groups like Common Cause began to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. Gov’t. L. Rev. 1, 
27 (2008).  
66 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
67 United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
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agitate for limits on both contributions and expenditures (to be compensated for by 
providing public funds to finance political campaigns), both as a means of limiting 
influence and to ensure that the “little-guy’s” voice would not be lost in the marketplace 
of ideas.  This concept proved attractive and eventually resulted in the 1971 Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA).68  
 Although the public funding provisions did not survive, the FECA placed strict 
limits on how much candidates could spend from their own pockets and established new 
rules for reporting contributions and expenditures by others. Because of these reporting 
requirements, the law’s drafters eliminated restrictions on how much could be expended 
by independent individuals, groups or corporations in support of candidates for office, but 
kept restrictions on direct contributions by corporations and unions.   
 The FECA was a major step forward in campaign finance refrom, but it proved 
just the beginning of modern legislative efforts. Revelations about fund-raising 
shenanigans by the Nixon re-election team that surfaced during the Watergate scandal set 
in motion calls for more drastic action, culminating in the 1974 amendments to the FECA 
that, for all intents, created a whole new law.69 In addition to stringent limitations on 
contributions, the revised FECA limited “‘expenditures by individuals or groups relative 
to a clearly identified candidate’ to $1,000 per candidate per election,”70 specifically 
including corporations and unions as subject to these restrictions.    
These limitations, along with other provisions of the amended law calling for the 
establishment of the Federal Elections Commission and overall limits on campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 As amended at 2 U.S.C.§§431-455 (2000). 
69 Urofsky, supra note 14, at 56. 
70 Id. 
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spending, were almost immediately challenged by a variety of aggrieved parties. The 
result was the decision by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo.71 
1. Buckley v. Valeo 
Challenges to the 1974 revised version of the FECA were raised by an unlikely 
coalition of office holders, candidates for office and a variety of public-interest groups.72  
Their complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
“sought both a declaratory judgment that the major provisions of the Act were 
unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement of those provisions.”73 What 
followed was a ping-pong-like procedural path between the trial court and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  
Eventually returning to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, the majority 
found avoiding corruption of the electoral process to be “a clear and compelling 
interest.”74 On that basis, the court upheld most of the provisions of the law, including its 
limitations on contributions and expenditures.  
On appeal, the majority per curium opinion of the Supreme Court noted that 
“[t]he Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities.”75 In addition, the Court said, “[t]he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
72 Id. (Among the plaintiffs were “a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, a 
United States Senator who [was] a candidate for re-election, … the Committee for a 
Constitutional Presidency - McCarthy ‘76, … the Mississippi Republican Party, the 
Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., [and] the American 
Conservative Union ….”). 
73 Id. at 8-9. 
74 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C.Cir. 1975).  
75 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
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constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, stemmed from [that] 
Court’s recognition that ‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association’” [citations 
omitted]. 76   
Having established to their own satisfaction that “contribution and expenditure 
limitations … implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,”77 the justices in the 
majority then turned their attention to analyzing whether the government restrictions on 
each, nonetheless, would pass constitutional muster. The verdict proved favorable for 
limitations on contributions, but unfavorable for restrictions on independent expenditures. 
Section 608(b) of the FECA “provides…that ‘no person shall make contributions 
to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, 
exceed $1,000.’”78 In line with the arguments advanced for almost seven decades of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
established by our Constitution.” Therefore, “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest 
protection to such political expression ….”) 
 
76 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). (Of importance to corporate interests, the Court 
added that “‘freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political 
beliefs and ideas’ [is] a freedom that encompasses ‘[t]he right to associate with the 
political party of one's choice.’” Having established the important constitutionally 
protected speech and association rights present in the case, the Court turned its attention 
to examining the rationales advanced by the government and its supporters for the need to 
regulate nonetheless. The lower court had upheld the limits on contributions, in part, on 
the theory that regulation of such expenditures constituted limits on conduct and not 
speech, following the logic of the Court’s earlier decision in United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).. The Supreme Court demurred.  
“We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations 
are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The expenditure of 
money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card.” The 
Court gave similar short shrift to the government’s argument that the FECA’s restrictions 
were no more than legitimate time, place or manner regulations.) 
77 Id. at 23. 
78 2 U.S.C.§§431-455 (2000) (The statute defines ‘person’ broadly to include ‘an 
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or 
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campaign finance regulation prior to Buckley, the Court found the possibility of 
corruption or appearance of corruption of the electoral process caused by allowing 
unlimited contributions of funds to political campaigns sufficient rationales for upholding 
the $1,000 campaign contribution limits of the FECA. 
  By contrast, the Act’s limitations on expenditures, according to the Court, “limit 
political expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms.’”79 The Court noted that “[t]he plain effect of [the statute] is to prohibit all 
individuals, who are neither candidates nor owners of institutional press facilities, and all 
groups, except political parties and campaign organizations, from voicing their views 
….”80 Undoubtedly, the Court noted, “[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or 
group can spend on political communication during a campaign … reduces the quantity 
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached.”81  
   Although the court of appeals had approved the limitations on expenditures as 
only “a loophole-closing provision”82 designed to prevent contributions being funneled to 
political races in circumvention of the limits on contributions, the Supreme Court felt this 
limitation was more restrictive of speech. “The markedly greater burden on basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
group of persons.’” This “limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may 
contribute to a candidate or political committee,” said the Court, “entails only a marginal 
restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”) 
79 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) at 71, (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
32 (1968) (Section 608 (e) (1) of the FECA states that no “person” may make a 
contribution “relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when 
added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the 
election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.”) 
80 Id. at 39-40. 
81 Id. at 19. 
82 Id. at 44. 
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freedoms caused by [the FECA’s limitations on independent expenditures] … cannot be 
sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less 
intrusive contribution limitations,” said the Court. “We find that the governmental 
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify 
[the FECA’s] ceiling on independent expenditures.”83 The Court added, “[a]dvocacy of 
the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy 
of the passage or defeat of legislation.”84 
The Court also rejected another potentially compelling interest that it called “the 
ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups 
to influence the outcome of elections”85 as justification for restrictions on independent 
expenditures. “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,” said the Court, “is wholly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Id. at 45. 
84 Id. at 48. (Those in favor of such restrictions, said the Court, “contend that it is 
necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations by 
the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for other portions of 
the candidate's campaign activities.”  Id. at 46. Although such maneuvers might 
legitimately be limited under the campaign contribution provisions of the FECA, the 
Court noted that “limits [on] expenditures for express advocacy of candidates made 
totally independently of the candidate and his campaign [are] … [u]nlike contributions 
[and] may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may 
prove counterproductive [which] … alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given 
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” , “[w]hile the 
independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental interest 
in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” said the 
Court, “it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression.”) 
85 Id. 
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foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of infromation from diverse and antagonistic sources ….’”86  
 The constitutional protections of freedom of speech “against governmental 
abridgment of free expression,” concluded the Court, “cannot properly be made to 
depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.” The Court added, 
“[F]or the reasons stated, we conclude that [the FECA’s] independent expenditure 
limitation is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.”87 
Seven of the justices participating in the decision joined in striking down limits on 
independent campaign expenditures found in § 608(e) of the FECA. Only Justice White 
dissented from this view (Justice Stevens took no part in the decision).  
Although most members of the Court agreed that the need to protect the sanctity 
of the electoral process by limiting the corrupting influence (or possibility of corruption) 
of direct contributions was compelling enough to justify the FECA’s restrictions, seven 
agreed that this argument, and the “ancillary argument” in “equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections,”88 were less than 
compelling when raised to justify limitations on independent expenditures.89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Id. at 49, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), which is 
quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
87 Id. at 50. 
88 Id. at 54. 
89 Of particular interest to the discussion of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
later in this article, the word “corporation,” other than in the name of a case, appears in 
Buckley only in the quote from the statute defining the entities covered by the FECA and 
in the Court’s discussion of disclosure requirements. There is little doubt that the Court’s 
actions invalidating limitations on campaign expenditures were intended to be across the 
board, applying to individuals, corporations and other organizations and associations as 
well. This understanding was confirmed in the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy in 
Citizens United. Although the Court in Buckley technically “did not consider [the 
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Four months after the Buckley decision, Congress reenacted parts of the stricken 
statute.90 Interpreting Buckley as having invalidated all limitations on independent 
expenditures, the revision included § 441b that once again attempted to restrict such 
expenditures specifically for corporations and unions.  
2. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti  
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,91 the Court again dealt with political 
speech, specifically independent expenditures made by corporations. Massachusetts had 
proposed a constitutional amendment that called for a progressive personal income tax. 
Two banks, including First National, and three companies wanted to speak out through 
media advertisements against the amendment’s potential passage. Afraid that such 
actions might subject them to a state criminal statute that prohibited corporations from 
spending money to influence the vote on questions put to the voters unless the question 
had a material effect on their business,92 they queried the state Attorney General (Bellotti) 
as to whether he intended to enforce the criminal statute against them. When the answer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
FECA’s] § 610 separate ban on corporate and union independent expenditures” in 
addition to the limitations in § 608(e), “[h]ad §610 been challenged in the wake of 
Buckley,” said Justice Kennedy, “it could not have been squared with the reasoning and 
analysis of that precedent.” Justice Kennedy went on to note that the “expenditure ban 
invalidated in Buckley, § 608(e), applied to corporations and unions and some of the 
prevailing plaintiffs in Buckley were corporations [citations omitted].” In addition, “[t]he 
Buckley Court did not invoke the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine to suggest that 
§ 608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been constitutional if it had applied only to 
corporations and not to individuals.”  Finally, said Kennedy, the Buckley majority 
opinion “cited with approval the Automobile Workers dissent, which argued that § 610 
was unconstitutional.” 
90 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 
(1976). 
91 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
92 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55 § 8 (West Supp. 1977). 
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came back in the affirmative, the corporate leaders sought to have the statute declared 
unconstitutional.   
The Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that it could see no objection 
sufficient to take such action and upheld the statute.93 Petitioners then appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
This case, unlike Buckley, dealt with state law, so the Court could have 
distinguished the case on those grounds. Also, unlike Buckley, the statute limited only the 
expenditures of corporations, and was not concerned with candidate elections, but only 
with referendum and ballot measures. However, the prohibition was very similar to the 
language of § 608(e) of the FECA overturned by the Court in Buckley. The state law 
stated that corporations could not “directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute 
… any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of … influencing or affecting the 
vote on any question submitted to the voters.”94  
Significantly for the future of independent campaign expenditure restrictions, 
Bellotti struck down such limitations as unconstitutional. The vote, however, was 5-4 (the 
vote in Buckley was 7-1 on the provision regarding expenditures). Justice Powell 
delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, Justice 
Blackmun and Justice Stevens (who did not participate in Buckley).  
For the majority, the issue was clear: “The proper question … must be whether § 
8 [of the Massachusetts law] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to 
protect.”95 The Court noted that “[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977). 
94 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
95 Id. at 776. 
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would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.”96 The type of speech 
limited here, wrote Justice Powell, “is the type of speech indispensable to decision 
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a 
corporation rather than an individual.”97 
The lower court had determined that although the First Amendment is applicable 
to the states through the 14th Amendment, corporations do not have the right to liberty 
that the 14th Amendment guarantees to individuals. The Court disagreed. “Freedom of 
speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment always have been 
viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, 
and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right when it has been asserted 
by corporations,” said Justice Powell.98  
Once the Court determined that the identity of the speaker was irrelevant to the 
analysis of the case, the Court applied strict scrutiny to determine if the state was justified 
in prohibiting speech “intimately related to the process of governing.”99 Massachusetts 
argued that “[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption and 
‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for 
the wise conduct of government’” necessitated the state’s efforts.100  
The Court majority, conceding that these are interests of high importance, 
nonetheless remained as unmoved as their brethren had been to similar rationales 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Id. at 777. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (The Court found “no support in the First or the Fourteenth Amendment … for the 
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First 
Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation ….”) 
99 Id. at 786. 
100 Id. at 788-789, quoting United States v. United Automobile Workers, supra, 352 U.S., 
at 575, 77 S.Ct., at 533. 
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advanced in Buckley. The argument that the speech paid for by corporations should be 
limited because it may influence the result of referenda is unconvincing, said the Court, 
because “the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly reason to suppress 
it ….”101 
Justice White dissented from the holdings in Buckley/Bellotti that government 
limits on independent campaign expenditures for candidates or issues are 
unconstitutional. He stuck to that opinion in each subsequent case.  
In Buckley, Justice White observed that “this case depends on whether the 
nonspeech interests of the Federal Government in regulating the use of money in political 
campaigns are sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects [italics added] that the 
limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of candidates and their 
supporters.”102 Justice White believed they did.  
Justice White advanced two principal and related justifications for his opinion. He 
first argued that the majority should not have overridden what he termed the 
“congressional judgment,” that limitations on expenditures would “counter the corrosive 
effects [italics added] of money” on campaigns for federal office.103  
Justice White also disagreed with the majority’s determination that limits on 
expenditures would seriously curtail protected speech. “[T]he argument that money is 
speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment 
proves entirely too much,” he said.104 Furthermore, “it should be unnecessary to point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Id. at 791.  
102 Id. at 260 (White, J. dissenting). 
103 Id. (White, J. dissenting). 
104 Id. (White, J. dissenting). 
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out, money is not always equivalent to or used for speech,” said Justice White, “even in 
the context of political campaigns ….”105  
Consistent with his views in Buckley, Justice White, in an opinion joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, also dissented from the majority opinion in Bellotti. His 
approval of the Massachusetts expenditure-limits statute in Bellotti was predicated not 
only on his dollars-do-not-equal-speech view, but also on the differences between 
corporations and individuals. Although conceding that some froms of corporate 
communications are protected by the First Amendment, Justice White noted that “what 
some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of 
communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not 
at all furthered by corporate speech.”106  
 Unlike individuals, “[c]orporations are artificial entities created by law for the 
purpose of furthering certain economic goals,” Justice White noted.107 “The special status 
of corporations [italics added] have placed them in a position to control vast amounts of 
economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the 
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.”108  
Perhaps in an attempt to distinguish his argument from the “level-playing-field” 
rationale rejected by the majority in both Buckley and Bellotti, Justice White argued that 
curtailment of corporate independent expenditures could be justified because it was “not 
[based on] … equalizing the resources of opposing candidates or opposing positions,” but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Id. at 263 (White, J. dissenting). 
106 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 434 U.S. 765, 804-805 (1978) (White, J. 
dissenting). 
107 Id. at 809 (White, J. dissenting). 
108 Id. (White, J. dissenting). 
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rather on “preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth as a result 
of special advantages [italics added] extended by the State … from using that wealth to 
acquire an unfair advantage in the political process ….”109  Justice White also suggested 
that protecting the rights of minority shareholders who do not support the corporation’s 
speech would be a sufficient rationale for the state’s restrictions on corporate 
expenditures on public issues.110  
Perhaps as important as the consistent (and non-negotiable) logic of Justice 
White’s arguments for the Court’s ultimate holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce111 favoring independent campaign limitations was the development of the 
rhetoric used to express these arguments. The three phrases that eventually surfaced as 
key justifying language in Austin were the creation of political “war chests,” the “special 
advantages” of corporations and the “corrosive effects” of expenditures, all of which first 
appeared in dissenting opinions by Justice White in Buckley or Bellotti.112    
Justice Rehnquist was part of the majority opinion in Buckley. His dissenting 
opinion in Bellotti suggests, however, that the primary reasons for joining the Buckley per 
curium opinion were based on the application of the independent expenditure limitations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Id. (White, J. dissenting). 
110 Justice White’s shareholder-protection rationale subsequently was picked up and 
advanced in opinions by Justice Brennan and others in later cases, but was never adopted 
by a majority of the Court. 
111 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990). 
112 The concept that the failure to limit independent expenditures by entities with great 
wealth would enable them to create a “war chest” of funds to overwhelm the marketplace 
of ideas first surfaced in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter in the 1957 case of United 
States v. Auto Workers. Justice White adopted this concept as his own in his dissent in 
Buckley and, as will be seen, the term soon began to appear as language in majority 
opinions. Similarly, the phrase “special advantages” twice appeared in Justice White’s 
dissent in Bellotti, but was then adopted by the majority in subsequent opinions. The term 
“corrosive” also emerged in Justice White’s dissent in Buckley. This language would later 
be picked up by Justices Brennan and Marshall in majority opinions. 
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in § 608(e) of the FECA to all types of speakers, individuals and corporations, and that it 
was a statute directed toward actions by the federal government.  
In Bellotti, citing Chief Justice Marshall for the proposition that “‘[a] corporation 
… [b]eing the mere creature of law … possesses only those properties which the charter 
of creation confers upon it …,’” Justice Rehnquist stated, “I can see no basis for 
concluding that the liberty of … corporation[s] to engage in political activity with regard 
to matters having no material effect on [their] business … ” would be within the 
“purposes for which the [state] permitted these corporations to be organized ….”113  
Combining the rationales advanced in the dissenting opinions in Buckley and 
Bellotti suggested that in future challenges to unlimited, independent corporate campaign 
expenditures, Justice White would always favor such restrictions and Justice Rehnquist 
would likely favor restrictions if limited to corporations. It also suggested that at least 
some of the arguments advanced by Justices White and Rehnquist in Bellotti related to 
restrictions on corporations might help persuade Justices Brennan and Marshall to join in 
upholding expenditure limits, especially if such limitations could be based on rationales 
other than preventing corruption of the electoral process or leveling the marketplace-of-
ideas playing field, both soundly rejected by the majorities in Buckley and Bellotti 
3. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley 
The court next dealt with the issue of corporate political speech with a challenge 
to the Election Refrom Act of 1974, adopted by the voters of Berkeley, California.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 434 U.S. 765, 804-805 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. 
dissenting), citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L.Ed. 629 
(1819). 
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act placed a $250 limitation on contributions to committees “fromed to support or oppose 
ballot measures submitted to popular vote.”114 
Citizens Against Rent Control (CARC), an organization fromed to oppose a ballot 
measure that would impose such an ordinance, accepted contributions in excess of legal 
limits. The Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission, in accordance with § 604 of 
the Election Reform Act, ordered the organization to pay the excess funds to the city 
treasury.  
CARC challenged the order, asking a California Superior Court judge for 
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the ordinance. Eventually, the California 
Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s action, finding that it had a compelling interest 
to ensure that such interest groups would not be able to “corrupt” the election process by 
spending “large amounts to support or oppose a ballot measure.”115  
Chief Justice Burger authored the majority opinion in CARC’s appeal of the 
California court decision, joined by Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens. 
Acknowledging the long tradition of First Amendment protection both for “persons 
sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end” and of “a 
marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas,”116 the Court found the 
ordinance adopted by the city had materially affected both of these protected rights. 
Overturning the lower court’s decision, the Court concluded that “[p]lacing limits on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkley, Calif., 
454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
115 Id. at 293. 
116 Id. at 295. 
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contributions which in turn limit expenditures, plainly impairs freedom of expression,” 
which the Court held, violated both Buckley and Bellotti.117  
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion, but was careful to note his 
vote was based on the over-inclusiveness of the ordinance. Had the law been designed to 
regulate only corporate contribution limits, Rehnquist’s opinion suggests, he likely would 
have upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.  
Justice Marshall concurred reluctantly on the basis that, although he thought it 
highly likely that corruption of the electoral process might occur, there was no actual 
evidence to demonstrate that the contributions prohibited by the ordinance justified the 
California court’s decision. Not surprisingly, Justice White registered the dissenting vote, 
noting that the city ordinance actually limited contributions and not independent 
expenditures. In addition, he reiterated his view that both Buckley and Bellotti had been 
wrongly decided.  
Although CARC did not involve limitations on independent campaign 
expenditures for candidates, one can see the solidifying of positions by those justices 
troubled by the decisions in Buckley and Bellotti. This process would continue in FEC v. 
National Right to Work Committee, the Court’s next foray into the thicket of attempted 
corporate political speech regulation.118 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Id. at 299. (Justices Blackmun and O’Connor concurred in the judgment, finding 
simply that the city “neither demonstrated a genuine threat to its important governmental 
interests nor employed means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of 
protected activity.”) 
118 Federal Election Com’n v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
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4. FEC v. National Right to Work Committee 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as amended in 1974) prohibited 
corporations and labor unions from making contributions to or expenditures in relation to 
federal elections. As discussed above, although such restrictions were arguably stricken 
in Buckley on First Amendment grounds, Congress re-enacted them almost immediately 
in § 441b of the revised law. However, § 441b allowed unions and corporations to spend 
money on elections if it came from “separate segregated funds.”119 These segregated 
funds had severe restrictions on their use, including specific regulations of who could 
make contributions to such funds.  
The National Right to Work Committee (NRWC), a corporation without capital 
stock, solicited contributions for its segregated funds from approximately 267,000 people 
who in some way had contributed to the organization in the past. The FEC said this was 
in violation of § 441b(b)(4)(C) because solicitations were not from “members.”120  
The NWRC sought injunctive and declaratory relief in a complaint filed in a 
Virginia federal trial court, while the Commission filed an enforcement proceeding one 
month later in a federal court in the District of Columbia. The suits were consolidated in 
the D.C. district court that “granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1971) 
120 Federal Election Com’n v. National Right to Work Committee, 501 F.Supp. 422, 424. 
(D.C.D.C. 1982). 
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the basis of stipulated facts.”121 The Court of Appeals for the District of the Columbia 
reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.122  
Rather than decide the case on the relatively straightforward basis that Buckley 
made any expenditure limits codified in any part of § 441b a moot point,123 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, focused on the narrow definitional issues 
discussed in the lower courts. The basic question, said the Court, “ultimately comes down 
to whether respondent National Right to Work Committee … limited its solicitation of 
funds to ‘members’ within the meaning of [the federal statute].”124  
While answering in the negative, Justice Rehnquist also discussed at length the 
limitations on general corporate expenditures contained in § 441b. Agreeing with the 
FEC, Justice Rehnquist noted that the purpose of § 441b was “to ensure that substantial 
aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages [italics added] which go with 
the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’ 
[italics added] which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided 
by the contributions.”125  
Characterizing § 441b as prohibiting corporate independent expenditures in 
federal elections, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the reason for examining the NRWC’s 
actions was to determine if the limitations should be applied to the organization’s 
solicitations because the statute did permit “some participation of … corporations in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Id. 
122 Federal Election Com’n v. National Right to Work Committee, 456 U.S. 914 (1982). 
123 Noted almost 30 year later by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion in Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).   
124 Federal Election Com’n v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197, at 198 
(1982). 
125 Id. at 207. 
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federal electoral process by allowing [them to create] … ‘separate segregated fund[s],’ 
which may be ‘utilized for political purposes.’”126  
 Justice Rehnquist then provided a multi-page history of governmental attempts to 
regulate campaign contributions and expenditures pre-Buckley to suggest (his long-held 
view) that limitations on corporate expenditures might pass constitutional muster. Thus, 
although the Court actually only decided the case on the narrow point as to whether the 
NRWC’s definition of “member,” in terms of solicitation of funds, matched the definition 
of the statute, Justice Rehnquist was able to plant logical and rhetorical seeds that grew 
into the ultimate revocation of the Buckley/Bellotti decisions that disfavored regulation of 
corporate independent campaign expenditures.127   
5. FEC v. National Conservative PAC  
Justice Rehnquist again assumed the role of opinion writer in the Court’s next 
major election campaign case, FEC v. National Conservative PAC.128 The case involved 
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act)129 that allows candidates for 
president to receive public financing for their general election campaigns if they represent 
major political parties. Section 9012(f) of the statute says that independent political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Id. at 201. 
127 Linda Greenhouse, The Revolution Next Time?, N.Y. Times, December 18, 2010, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/the-revolution-next-
time/?ref=lindagreenhouse. (Greenhouse called Justice Rehnquist a “master of the long 
game” for his ability to foresee the impact his opinions could possibly have on future 
decisions, even when writing in dissent. “What he excelled at was seeing around corners 
to which others appeared oblivious, planting little seeds in little cases where the seeds 
could germinate and grow while waiting for the big case to come along. It happened in 
one doctrinal area after another: religion, equal protection, criminal law. Years later, there 
would be a Rehnquist opinion to cite for a proposition more sweeping than the context in 
which the case had originally appeared.”) 
128 Federal Election Com’n v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 
U.S. 480 (1985). 
129 Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1972) 
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committees cannot spend more than $1,000 on a candidate who has decided to accept 
public financing.  
This provision was challenged by the National Conservative Political Action 
Committee (NCPAC) and the Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), which 
announced they planned to spend large amounts of money in the next campaign for 
president.130 
 On appeal, faced with a provision of a federal statute limiting independent 
campaign expenditures that did not apply only to corporations, Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and O’Connor, first determined 
that both the NCPAC and the FCM were political organizations (PACs) with their 
“primary purpose [being] … to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election or 
defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and by 
making [their] own expenditures.”131 Clearly, said the Court, “the PACs’ independent 
expenditures at issue in this case are squarely prohibited by [the challenged statute], and 
we proceed to consider whether that prohibition violates the First Amendment.”132 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F.Supp. 797 
(E.D.Pa.1983) (aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Federal Election Comm'n v. National 
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 
(1985)). The Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee and Edward 
Mezvinsky (chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee) filed the lawsuit 
against the two organizations hoping to establish that § 9012(f) could prohibit the PACs 
from their spending plans. Ultimately, a federal court of appeals held that § 9012(f) was 
in violation of the First Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional because “it is 
substantially overbroad, and … cannot permissibly be given a narrowing construction to 
cure the overbreadth.” 
131 Federal Election Com’n v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 
U.S. 480, 490 (1985). 
132 Id. at 492. (noting that, in Buckley, Justice Rehnquist said, the Court held that “[a] 
restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression ….”. 
	   39	  
Justice Rehnquist was quick to emphasize that, despite their corporate form, the 
Court’s decision in NRWC did not disqualify the organizations in this case from First 
Amendment protection. “[NRWC] turned on the special treatment historically accorded 
corporations” and the “special advantages [italics added] the state confers on the 
corporate form,”133 wrote Justice Rehnquist, quoting his own words in that earlier case, 
although skipping over the fact that NRWC actually was decided on a very narrow, 
definitional point of law.  
 Further distinguishing NRWC, Justice Rehnquist noted that although “NCPAC 
and FCM are … formally incorporated; these are not ‘corporations’ cases because 
9012(f) applies not just to corporations but to any … ‘organization’ … that accepts 
contributions or makes expenditures in connection with electoral campaigns.”134 Besides, 
said Justice Rehnquist, these are not corporations that might corrupt the process through 
“the influence of political war chests [italics added] funneled through the corporate 
form.”135  
In striking down the law’s application to the PACs, Justice Rehnquist’s 
overbreadth analysis reeled in both Justices Brennan and Stevens for these issues. Justice 
White, as expected, dissented on grounds similar to his objections in Buckley.   
Of particular importance for the Court’s decision in Austin five years later, Justice 
White’s unwavering opposition to objections to limits on corporate independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Even though they “spend substantial amounts of money in order to communicate their 
political ideas,” such actions, said the Court, are clearly protected by the First 
Amendment. “[F]orbidding the expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them is much 
like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of 
an amplifying system.”)  
133 Id. at 495. 
134 Id. at 496. 
135 Id. at 501. 
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campaign expenditures apparently finally won over Justice Marshall. Dissenting in 
NCPAC, Justice Marshall, in a straightforward rejection of relatively recent precedent, 
simply announced that “[a]lthough I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that 
distinguished contributions from independent expenditures for First Amendment 
purposes, I now believe that the distinction has no constitutional significance.”136   
6. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
One of the challenges the court and the legislature would face in limiting the 
corporate political speech of corporations would be the ability to distinguish which types 
of corporations restrictions would apply to. Even when corporate political speech was 
still being protected by the Bellotti decision, the court began to address this issue with the 
decision in the case of FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc..137  
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) was incorporated under Massachusetts 
law as a nonprofit, non-stock corporation. Its stated corporate purpose was “[t]o foster 
respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn 
….”138 MCFL raised funds through fundraising activities and donations of members, past 
contributors or supporters. The organization did “not accept any contributions from 
business corporations or unions.”139 
In January 1972, MCFL began publication of a newsletter distributed mainly to 
contributors, but also to supporters when funding permitted. Recipients of the newsletter 
were typically encouraged to contact decision makers to express their opinions. The 
organization published a special edition of the newsletter in September 1978 before the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Id. at 519 (Marshall, J. dissenting).  
137 Federal Election Com’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
138 Id. at 241. 
139 Id. at 242. 
	   41	  
state’s primary elections to be held in November. The issue listed all the candidates 
running in Massachusetts for every state and federal office in each voting district. 
Readers were encouraged to vote for pro-life candidates.140 
The FEC received a complaint that the special edition was in violation of § 441b 
of the FECA because it “represented an expenditure of funds from a corporate treasury to 
distribute to the general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political 
candidates.”141 The FEC subsequently found that “probable cause existed”142 that the 
MCFL had indeed violated the statute. Attempts at conciliation failed, and the FEC filed 
a complaint in federal district court.  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed 
with the trial court over the applicability of the statute to the MCFL, but “affirmed the 
District Court’s holding that the statute as so applied was unconstitutional.”143  
The Supreme Court first held that § 441b limitations on independent corporate 
expenditures did apply to MCLF’s special edition newsletter calling for support or 
opposition to various candidates for office, a position agreed upon by all the members of 
the Court.  Justice Brennan, writing for himself and four others, then determined that the 
First Amendment interests of this special-interest organization in corporate form 
outweighed the government’s reasons for wishing to limit its activities. In the process, 
Justice Brennan carefully crafted an opinion that set the stage for the Court’s holding in 
Austin four years later, by leaving the protections provided by the Bellotti decision in 
place but changing the reasoning and limiting the scope.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Id. at 243 (because “[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November without your vote in 
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141 Id. at 244. 
142 Id. at 245. 
143 Id. (citing Federal Election Com’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 769 F.2d. 
13 (C.A.1 1985)). 
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In the MCLF case, said Justice Brennan, expenditures by organizations like 
MCLF “do not pose … danger of corruption [because] MCFL was formed to disseminate 
political ideas, not to amass capital.”144 Its “capital” reflects “not a function of its success 
in the economic market-place,” but “its popularity in the political marketplace.”145 
Therefore, said Justice Brennan, MCFL is not the kind of organization “that has been the 
focus of regulation of corporate political activity.”146  
In addition to the determination that allowing the MCFL’s expenditures would not 
create the unfairness in the marketplace potentially caused by allowing such activity by a 
for-profit corporation, Justice Brennan also argued that contributions to the MCFL were 
designed for strictly political purposes. Therefore, such contributions would not be “using 
an individual’s money for purposes that the individual may not support.”147  
 Although noting what Justice Brennan called “the legitimacy of Congress’ 
concern that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain 
unfair advantage in the political marketplace,” he also had to acknowledge that this 
“concern [about the] … application of § 441b to commercial enterprises … [is] a question 
not before us ….”148 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan proceeded to create a three-part test to 
determine which corporations could be regulated and which could not.  
 Applying the test to the MCFL, he found first that “it was formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.”149 
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147 Id. at 260. This argument would show up again in Justice Brennan’s concurring 
opinion in Austin. 
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Second, “it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its 
assets or earnings.”150 Finally, said Justice Brennan, “MCFL was not established by a 
business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from 
such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of 
direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace.”151 
In supporting its position, the FEC’s arguments had picked up language used by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s in an earlier case that the special characteristics of corporations 
necessitate careful regulation. Justice Brennan observed that this argument “relies on the 
long history of regulation of corporate political activity as support for the application of § 
441b to MCFL. Evaluation of the Commission’s argument [therefore] requires close 
examination of the underlying rationale for this longstanding regulation.”152  
Justice Brennan then quoted from both pre-Buckley and post-Buckley decisions 
about “the influence of political war chests [italics added] funneled through the corporate 
form” and “the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections.”153 He also cited 
language from earlier cases expressing concerns about “those who exercise control over 
large aggregations of capital” and “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the 
special advantages [italics added] which go with the corporate form of organization.”154 
Adopting the “corrosive influence” language first originated by Justice White in his 
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152 Federal Election Com’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, at 256-
257 (1986). 
153 Id. at 257. 
154 Id. It should be noted that Justice Brennan failed to point out, however, that none of 
this language was ever the basis of a previous Court’s decision and reflected nothing 
other than the legislative intent behind the statute’s limitations which the holding in 
Buckley called into constitutional question. 
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dissent in Buckley, Justice Brennan concluded that all this “reflects the conviction that it 
is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”155 In 
contradiction to the language in the Buckley decision that said that “[t]he concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others,”156 Justice Brennan indicated that “[d]irect corporate 
spending on political activity … may … provide an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace.”157  
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justices White, Blackmun and 
Stevens, would have upheld the FEC’s regulation of the MCFL on the straightforward 
basis that it was a corporation and “that the special characteristics of the corporate 
structure require particularly careful regulation.”158 The Chief Justice, argued that 
previous decisions were based on “rid[ding] the political process of the corruption and 
appearance of corruption that … expenditures for candidates from corporate funds 
[allows]” and “… protect[ing] the interests of individuals who pay money into a 
corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates for public 
office.”159  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Id. 
156 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976) at 48-49. 
157 Federal Election Com’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, at 257 
(1986). Justice Brennan noted that although an “availability of funds is after all a rough 
barometer of public support … [t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation 
… are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They 
reflect instead,” he suggested, “the economically motivated decisions of investors and 
customers.” This argument would show up again in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion 
in Austin.  
158 Id. at 266 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (quoting Federal Election Com’n v. National 
Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
159 Federal Election Com’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, at 267 
(1986) (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). (Arguing that the decision in NCPAC was based on 
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The Chief Justice concluded that “[t]he distinction between contributions and 
independent expenditures is not a line separating black from white. I would defer to the 
congressional judgment that corporations are a distinct category with respect to which 
this sort of regulation is constitutionally permissible.”160 Justice White, joining Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, also added that he continued to believe that striking down 
limits on independent campaign expenditures in Buckley and Bellotti had been wrongly 
decided.  
7. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 161 the Supreme Court was asked to 
consider the constitutionality of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA).162 This 
statute prohibited corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent 
expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office. 
Corporations were allowed to spend money from segregated funds designated solely for 
political purposes.  
In 1985, Michigan held a special election to fill a vacancy in the Michigan House 
of Representatives. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corporation 
composed of more than 8,000 members, decided to use general treasury funds for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the inclusion of entities other than corporations, the Chief Justice suggested that limiting 
corporate expenditures was “an acceptable distinction, grounded in the judgment of the 
political branch, between political activity by corporate actors and that by organizations 
not benefiting from ‘the corporate shield which the State [has] granted to corporations as 
a form of quid pro quo’ for various regulations.”)  
160 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). 
161 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990). The statute 
was modeled after the §441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Chamber sought 
an injunction against the enforcement of the Act on the grounds that the Act violated the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
162 M.C.L. § 169.254 
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newspaper advertisements supporting a particular candidate. Fearing that the statute 
limiting expenditures might be interpreted as applicable to this course of action, the 
Chamber sought an injunction against the possible enforcement of the Act. A federal 
district court upheld the statute, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on First-Amendment 
grounds. The state appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.  He was joined by the quartet 
of Justices (Brennan, White, Rehnquist and Stevens) who were on record as opposing 
either all independent expenditures or at least those made by for-profit corporations. 
Justice Blackmun joined the majority opinion as well. 
Conceding at the outset that “the use of funds to support a political candidate is 
‘speech,’” Justice Marshall suggested that the basic questions in Austin were “whether 
[the statute] burdens the exercise of [this] speech and, if it does, whether it is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”163 The Court answered the first question 
affirmatively, concluding that the Michigan statute’s requirement that a corporation could 
only make such campaign expenditures from segregated political funds “burden[s] 
expressive activity.”164 Thus, the only questions remaining for the Court, said Justice 
Marshall, must deal with whether there exists a compelling state interest justifying the 
limitations imposed by the statute and whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).. The Michigan 
statute was very similar to the Massachusetts law considered in Bellotti. The primary 
distinction was that the Michigan law dealt with expenditures in support of or in 
opposition to any “candidate” whereas the Massachusetts statute prohibited the spending 
of money on speech directed at referenda proposed to the electorate. However, this 
distinction eventually played no role in the analysis of the issues presented in the case by 
the Court.  
164 Id. at 658. 
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The Court suggested that the government’s efforts to restrict “the influence of 
political war chests [italics added] funneled through the corporate form”165 based on the 
rationale of avoiding possible corruption of the electoral process could, in some 
circumstances, conceivably create the basis for finding a compelling state interest. 
Although “this Court has distinguished these [independent] expenditures from direct 
contributions in the context of federal laws,” wrote Justice Marshall, the Court also has 
“recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption 
posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate 
elections,”166 citing language in a footnote in Bellotti.  
Such a distinction is unnecessary in this case, however, said Justice Marshall, 
because “Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of corruption.”167 The corruption 
at issue here is “the corrosive [italics added] and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”168  Justice Marshall added that “the mere fact that corporations may accumulate 
large amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54 [of the MCFA]; rather, the unique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Id. (citing Federal Election Com’n v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 490 (1985)). 
166 Id. (citing First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 434 U.S. 765, 788 n. 26 (1978)). 
(Justice Kennedy, in Citizens United, pointed out that this was mere dicta “supported 
only by a law review student comment which misinterpreted Buckley.”) 
167 Id. at 659-660. 
168 Id. at 660. 
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state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries”169 
justifies the state in limiting the corporation’s independent expenditures.170   
“Corporate wealth,” said Justice Marshall, “can unfairly influence elections when 
it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the 
guise of political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated a 
sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by 
corporations.”171 
Justice Marshall then addressed the issue, raised by the Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, that the law as applied to this organization was overbroad.  Finding the law to 
be “precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending,” Justice 
Marshall disagreed, noting that corporations still had the ability to make such 
contributions via political action committees.  Justice Marshall similarly rejected the 
Chamber’s argument that the act was over-inclusive.  “Although some closely held 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Id. 
170 Id. Having created a new compelling reason for limiting independent expenditures by 
for-profit corporations, the next question, said Justice Marshall, is whether this 
compelling interest should be applied to the Chamber. Employing Justice Brennan’s 
three-part definitional test from MCFL, Justice Marshall noted that the MCFL, unlike the 
Chamber, was formed expressly for the purpose of promoting political ideas. The 
Chamber’s bylaws, in contrast, “set forth more varied purposes, several of which are not 
inherently political.” A second differentiation between the MCFL and the Chamber is 
that the MCFL had no shareholders. This distinction is important because, said Justice 
Marshall, shareholders may have an “economic disincentive for disassociating with it if 
they disagree with its political activity.” According to the Court, “[a]lthough the Chamber 
also lacks shareholders, many of its members may be similarly reluctant to withdraw as 
members even if they disagree with the Chamber’s political expression, because they 
wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with 
other members of the business community.” The final distinction was that the MCFL was 
independent from the influence of business corporations while the Chamber was not, 
because many of the members of the Chamber were for-profit corporations. The Court 
saw this as particularly problematic, because for-profit corporations could use the 
Chamber as a “conduit for corporate political spending.” 
171 Id. at 660. 
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corporations, just as some publicly held ones, may not have accumulated significant 
amounts of wealth,” said Justice Marshall, “they receive from the State the special 
benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the potential for distorting the 
political process. This potential for distortion justifies 54(1)’s general applicability to all 
corporations.”172 
Justice Brennan contributed a concurring opinion in Austin that focused 
extensively on what he saw as the plight of corporate shareholders forced to support the 
speech actions of their corporation’s managers. Justice Brennan envisioned the 
limitations on independent campaign expenditures as not only reducing the threat of their 
corrosive effects, but as a means of limiting runaway corporate executives as well.173  
Justice Scalia, in dissent, focused on Justice Marshall’s rationale that independent 
expenditures by corporations can be restricted because of the “unique state conferred 
corporate structure … [that] facilitates the amassing of large treasuries.”174 According to 
Justice Scalia, “[t]his analysis seeks to create one good argument by combining two bad 
ones.”175  
The simple fact that one receives “special advantages” from the state, wrote 
Justice Scalia, is not bad in and of itself and certainly is not enough to justify limiting the 
protection of the First Amendment. “The State cannot exact as a price of … special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Id. at 661.  
173 Id. Justice Brennan also noted the exception provided in the Michigan law that 
allowed corporations to spend money on speech through PACs. This distinction was 
significant, according to Brennan, because it helps to distinguish this statute from the one 
invalidated in Bellotti. 
174 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
175 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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advantages [italics added] the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”176 The second bad 
argument, said Justice Scalia, is that corporations “amas[s] large treasuries.”177 
According to Justice Scalia, the accumulation of such funds “alone is also not sufficient 
justification for the suppression of political speech.178 Justice Scalia continued, “[n]either 
of these two flawed arguments is improved by combining them ….”179 
Treating the majority opinion as a sub rosa overturning of Buckley, Justice Scalia 
argued that the logic of “Buckley… should not be overruled because it is entirely 
correct.”180 He continued, “[t]he advocacy of … entities that have ‘amassed great wealth’ 
will be effective only to the extent that it brings to people’s attention ideas which – 
despite the invariably self-interested and probably uncongenial source – strike them as 
true.”181  
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, 
suggested that the majority opinion validates “not one censorship of speech but two.”182 
In upholding the statute, Justice Kennedy noted, “the Court upholds a direct restriction on 
the independent expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time in its 
history.”183 Justice Kennedy argued that the proper analysis for the case would have been 
to “follow our cases on independent expenditure.”184 Buckley “invalidated a federal 
limitation on independent expenditures because they had no tendency to corrupt,” he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
177 Id. at 680 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
178 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
179 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
180 Id. at 683 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
181 Id. at 684 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
182 Id. at 695 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
183 Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
184 Id. at 702 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
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said.185 Bellotti and NCPAC followed suit. To Justice Kennedy, this meant the “specter of 
corruption … is missing,” which required the majority to invent a new compelling 
interest, the “corrosive effect,” to justify regulation.186  
The only justifiable rationale for limiting contributions or expenditures, said 
Justice Kennedy, citing the NCPAC, is to prevent the possibility of corruption when 
“elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the 
prospect of financial gain.”187 The object in limiting independent expenditures by the 
majority in Austin, Justice Kennedy said, is “the impermissible one of altering political 
debate by muting the impact of certain speakers.”188 
8. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 
With the Austin decision in place, the Court revisited federal campaign finance 
reform in 2003. Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA),189 in an attempt to target “soft money”, meaning money not subject to 
disclosure requirements and amount and source limitations in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA).  But it also extended the FECA limitations discussed in NRWC, 
which prohibited corporations and unions from spending general treasury funds on 
“express advocacy”. The BCRA extended the prohibition to include all “electioneering 
communications”.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Id. at 703 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
186 Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
187 Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Federal Election Com’n v. National Conservative 
Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 490 (1985)). 
188 Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
189 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). 
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The legislation was challenged immediately, with eleven actions filed challenging 
twenty BCRA provisions on a variety of constitutional grounds, including the First 
Amendment.190 A three-judge panel heard the suits in the U.S. District Court. The result 
was a lengthy two-judge per curium opinion and three individual opinions that ruled 
unconstitutional several provisions of BCRA, but left much of the law intact.191 
After Bellotti, there was a distinction between the protection for express advocacy 
and issue ads.192 The question for the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the BCRA 
changes would allow for issue ad expenditures, as Bellotti had, or whether it would begin 
to capture all political speech by corporations and unions. To the extent that some of the 
ads that mentioned candidates and were run in the 60-day period leading up to the 
election were in fact genuine “issue ads”, the BCRA extension would be overinclusive 
and suppress speech.193 
The lower court debated devoted significant energy to debating this question, and 
seemed to disagree about the amount of speech affected.194 But on appeal in McConnell 
v. FEC, a majority of the Supreme Court felt spent little time weighing the balance 
between issue ads and advocacy, declaring without appeal to evidence that enough of the 
speech was advocacy to justify the limitations imposed by the BCRA extension of 
FECA.195 
The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate and 
were aired during those relatively brief preelection time spans but had no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003). 
191 Id. 
192 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 770. 
193 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d., 367-73 (D.D.C.) 
194 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d., 367-73 (D.D.C.) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) 
195 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties and 
among the judges on the District Court. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
ads clearly had such a purpose.196 
 
The majority also spent little time establishing that the federal government had a 
compelling interest in suppressing the speech of corporations and unions.197 Relying on 
the language from Austin that the government has a compelling interest in preventing 
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form”, the Court upheld the provisions of the 
BCRA that impacted corporate political speech.198 
 
9. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.  
The Court, in the 2007 case of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 199 determined that an “as applied” challenge to §203 of the BCRA 
was acceptable in regard to ads suggesting voters “Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl 
and tell them to oppose” the filibustering of nominees for federal court appointments. 200 
The federal statute prohibited so-called “sham” advocacy advertising and marketing 
messages, ostensibly about an issue or controversy but in reality intended to help or hurt a 
candidate for office, but the definition of such electioneering communications was not 
clearly spelled out. 201 Fearing that its messages might be interpreted as falling within the 
confines of the act, WRTL brought suit to determine its potential liability.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Id. at 206 (citations omitted). 
197 Id. at 205 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
198 Id. 
199 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007) 
200 Id. at 459.  
201 Id. 
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First determining that McConnell did not rule out this form of “as applied” 
challenge, the Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito, went on to find that the 
ads in question were not the kinds of advocacy of a particular candidate suggested by the 
Court’s specific language in Buckley. 202 They were joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy 
and Thomas who argued that both Austin and McConnell should simply be overruled on 
the issue of limitations of independent campaign expenditures. 203 Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, contending that restrictions on WRTL’s ads were 
examples of electioneering communications the Court had approved in McConnell. 204 
10. Citizens United v. FEC 
In 2006, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with a multi-million dollar 
annual budget supplied mostly from donations by individuals, but also partly funded by 
for-profit corporations, produced a film entitled Hillary: The Movie. 205 The 90-minute 
documentary about Hillary Clinton was clearly unsympathetic to the senator, who was 
seeking to become the 2008 Democratic Party nominee for president. 206    
In addition to showings in theaters, Citizens United sought to distribute the movie 
through a video-on-demand provider. 207  In so doing, however, the organization became 
concerned that it might run afoul of BCRA §203, which had amended §441b “to prohibit 
any ‘electioneering communication’ defined as ‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Id. at 470 (“WRTL's three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.”) 
203 Id. at 490 ““Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment 
principles. In my view, it was wrongly decided”) and at 504 (“I would overrule that part 
of the Court's decision in McConnell upholding § 203(a) of BCRA”)(Scalia, J, 
concurring) 
204 Id. at 504 (Souter, J. dissenting) 
205 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, at 887 (2010) 
206 Id. 
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communication that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’ and is 
made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election.” §434(f)(3)(A). 208  
Seeking clarification of its status, Citizens United went to federal court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that §441b should not be applicable to Hillary: The Movie. The 
District Court denied Citizens United’s request and subsequently granted the FEC’s 
motion for summary judgment. 209 The case was first argued on its merits at the Supreme 
Court, which then asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether “either 
or both Austin and the part of McConnell” should be overruled. 210  
In the re-argued case, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia and, in part, Justice Thomas. 211 The Chief Justice added 
a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, addressing the issue of stare decisis. 212 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito and, in part, by Justice Thomas, also filed a 
concurring opinion. 213 Justice Stevens contributed a dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. 214 Justice Thomas dissented from part IV of 
the majority opinion. 215 
Justice Kennedy began his opinion by noting that “Section 441b’s prohibition 
on corporate independent expenditures is … a ban on speech. As a ‘restriction on the 
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a 
campaign,’ that statute ‘necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Id. at 887, quoting 2 U.S.C. §434(f)(3)(A).  
209 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 2008 WL 2788753. 
210 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 888 (2010) 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 917. 
213 Id. at 925. 
214 Id. at 929. 
215 Id. at 979. 
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number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.’” 216 Thus, said Justice Kennedy, “Its purpose and effect are to silence entities 
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.” 217 
According to Justice Kennedy, such a law raises significant constitutional 
issues. “The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow 
from each.  We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, 
the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.” 218  
In addition, said Justice Kennedy, “[t]he Court has recognized that First 
Amendment protection extends to corporations (citations omitted). This protection has 
been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech.” 219  Citing 
Bellotti, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he Court has … rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently 
under the First Amendment ….”220  
Justice Kennedy next turned to the issue of efforts to restrict independent 
campaign expenditures generally. “The Buckley Court explained that the potential for 
quid pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from 
independent expenditures,” said Justice Kennedy, and “invalidated §608(e)’s 
restrictions on independent expenditures ….”221  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Id. at 898 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976)) 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 899. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 900 (Citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, at 776(1978)) 
221 Id. at 901-02. (Buckley did not consider §610’s separate ban on corporate and union 
independent expenditures, Had §610 been challenged in the wake of Buckley, however, it 
could not have been squared with the reasoning and analysis of that case) 
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Although “Bellotti,” he continued, “did not address the constitutionality of 
[Massachussets’] ban on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates, … 
that restriction would have been unconstitutional under Bellotti’s central principle: that 
the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s 
corporate identity.” 222 
Turning to the Court’s decision in Austin which, according to Justice Kennedy, 
“uph[eld] a direct restriction on the independent expenditure of funds for political speech 
for the first time in [this Court’s] history,” 223  he noted that “the Austin Court identified a 
new governmental interest in limiting political speech: an anti-distortion interest” defined 
as “preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’ 224 The Court is 
thus confronted,” continued Justice Kennedy, “with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-
Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.” 225 
Observing that “the Government does little to defend” Austin’s anti-distortion 
rationale, Justice Kennedy also gave it little credence. 226 “The rule that political speech 
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth,” he said, “is a necessary consequence of 
the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




226 Id. at 904. 
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speech based on the speaker’s identity.” 227  In addition, “ [i]t is irrelevant for purposes of 
the First Amendment that corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” 228  
Saying that “[f]or the most part [the government] relinquishe[s] the anti-distortion 
rationale” as the basis for its justification of independent expenditures, Justice Kennedy 
turned his attention to the two other main rationales advanced by the government. 229 
“[T]he Government falls back on the argument that corporate political speech can be 
banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. In Buckley, the Court found this 
interest “sufficiently important” to allow limits on contributions but did not extend that 
reasoning to expenditure limits.” 230  Similarly, that interest “is not sufficient to displace 
the speech here in question. For the reasons explained above, we now conclude that 
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 231 As for the government’s argument about 
unfairness to dissident corporate shareholders, Justice Kennedy, citing Bellotti, suggested 
that “[t]here is … little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” 232  If “Congress finds that a problem 
exists,” Justice Kennedy observed, “we must give that finding due deference….”233 
However, he continued, “the remedies enacted by law … must comply with the First 
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the 
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governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical pre-
election period is not a permissible remedy.” 234 
The Court’s Citizen United decision235 was immediately controversial.236 The 
decision provoked severe criticism by President Barack Obama,237 political 
commentators and editorialists. Legislative proposals to restrict independent campaign 
expenditures were introduced in Congress, but all failed to pass.238 Now, nearly three 
years later, the uproar continues, and the impact of the decision on political campaigns 
continues to be discussed routinely in newspapers239 and blogs,240 as well as in legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Id. 
235 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
236 See Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. Rev. Books, Feb. 25, 2010, 
at 39, Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance 
Reform, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209/pagenum/all . Jeffrey 
Toobin, Bad Judgment, New Yorker (Jan. 22, 2010), available at 
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United Decision, Mediate, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.mediaite.com/online/the-medias-
shameful-inexcusable-distortion-of-the-supreme-courts-citizens-united-decision/. 
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scholarship.241 It also has been debated in legislatures242 and courthouses243 around the 
country, and it is possible the issue will find itself before the Supreme Court once 
again.244  
11. SpeechNow.org v. FEC 
The next significant decision after Citizens United was SpeechNow.org v. FEC245 
(“SpeechNow”). This case was directly responsible for the so-called “Super-PACs” that 
have received much of the criticism from campaign-finance-reform advocates during the 
2012 presidential primary season.246  
Although individuals were allowed to make unlimited individual expenditures 
prior to the Citizens United ruling, groups categorized by the FECA as a “political 
committee” were subject to specific provisions that limited the amount of money any one 
person could contribute.247 The limit for contributions from an individual to a political 
committee was $1,000 per committee, with a possible total of $69,900 for contributions 
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to all political committees.248 SpeechNow involved a challenge to these provisions as 
being unconstitutional in that they limited an individual’s ability to make independent 
expenditures on political issues.249  
An individual’s right to make independent expenditures on political speech had 
been established in Buckley250 and was not at issue in Citizens United.251 Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the trial court opinion in SpeechNow, which was initiated before Citizens 
United, was not dependent on that decision for its opinion.252 However, the subsequent 
ruling by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia came after the Citizens 
United decision, and that court relied heavily (in fact almost exclusively) on Citizens 
United.253 
The appellate court ruled that contribution limits must be closely drawn to serve a 
sufficiently important interest, and that the Supreme Court has “recognized only one 
interest sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests implicated by 
contributions for political speech: preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”254 In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stated specifically 
that “independent expenditures … do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”255 According to the court in SpeechNow, “this simplifies the task of 
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weighing the First Amendment interests implicated by contributions to SpeechNow 
against the government’s interest in limiting such contributions.”256  
In overturning the trial court’s decision, the appellate court essentially said that 
something always outweighs nothing. If “independent expenditures do not give rise to 
corruption,” any level of burden would be inappropriate when justified on the basis of 
possible corruption. And if the corruption interest is the only compelling interest the 
government has for burdening political speech, as was the case in SpeechNow, all such 
burdens of political speech are, by definition, unconstitutional.257  
12. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 
The second post -Citizens United decision that has affected the balance between 
campaign finance reform and free speech also relied heavily on Citizens United. In 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett258(“Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club”), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Arizona’s 
matching funds provisions for political candidates. At issue were provisions of Arizona’s 
Clean Elections Act (ACEA).259 Under the Act, political candidates who received a 
minimum number of five-dollar donations from Arizona voters were allowed to opt to 
receive public funding for their campaigns.260 By choosing public funding, candidates 
agreed to limit the amount of their own, private campaign funding in return for a set 
amount of public money.261  
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How much money any one candidate would receive from the state depended on a 
number of factors, including provisions of the Act which called for “equalizing” or 
matching funds.262 This provision mandated that if another candidate chose to opt out of 
public financing and use private funds, that amount would dictate how much money the 
publicly funded candidate would receive.263 If the privately funded candidate exceeded 
the public-funding allotment, § 16-952(B) of ACEA provided additional money to the 
publicly funded candidate in an attempt to equalize funding.264 If a privately funded 
candidate was running against a number of publicly funded candidates, each would 
receive equalizing funds.265  
In addition to matching money spent by the privately funded candidate, ACEA 
would match funds spent on behalf of that candidate by independent groups.266 Once the 
public funding limit was surpassed, any additional money spend either by or on behalf of 
the privately funded candidate would result in additional money being given to any 
publicly funded candidate in the same race. 267 
Citizens United and SpeechNow focused more on whether the burdening of 
speech by the challenged regulation was justified by a compelling interest. Both the 
Supreme Court and the DC Circuit Court said they were not. Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club, on the other hand, focused more on whether the underlying regulation actually 
burdened speech at all. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that ACEA posed 
only a minimal burden to speech because privately financed candidates could still spend 
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unlimited funds on political speech and upheld the Arizona law as constitutional.268 The 
Supreme Court disagreed, and, in a 5-4 decision, held that the relevant provisions of the 
ACEA violated the First Amendment.269  
According to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, “the matching funds 
provision ‘imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises 
[his] First Amendment right[s].’”270 The provision “forces the privately funded candidate 
to ‘shoulder a special and potentially significant burden’ when choosing to exercise his 
First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his candidacy.”271 
Once establishing that the provision imposed a burden, the Court was left to 
consider whether there was a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the 
infringement of First Amendment rights. The parties in Arizona Free Enterprise Club, 
however, failed to agree about which government interest was at issue in the case.272 The 
plaintiffs believed the ACEA was aimed at “leveling the playing field” in terms of 
candidate resources.273 Possibly because of the precedent against considering an 
equalizing interest as a compelling one, defendants countered that the government 
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interest being served by the ACEA actually was the elimination of corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.  
The Court first rejected the idea that leveling the playing field is a compelling 
government interest.274 In fact, in an earlier campaign finance case, the Court held that 
“discriminatory contribution limits meant to ‘level electoral opportunities for candidates 
of different personal wealth’ did not serve ‘a legitimate government interest’ let alone a 
compelling one.”275 Leveling the playing field, added the Court, had also been dismissed 
as a compelling interest in Buckley and Citizens United.276 “The Court is troubled by the 
fact that efforts to level the playing field means allowing the government to have an 
impact in the choice over who governs, and this is ‘a dangerous enterprise that cannot 
justify burdening protected speech.’”277  
Prior to Citizens United, the defendants’ arguments about the elimination of 
corruption might have had a chance. Although the Court discussed in some detail whether 
the ACEA is actually aimed at eliminating corruption,278 in the end, because the Court 
held that the provisions limit or burden independent expenditures (as opposed to 
contributions), the same language from Citizens United that was controlling in 
SpeechNow was controlling here.279 In other words, if independent expenditures cannot 
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give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption, then any provision aimed at 
limiting or burdening these expenditures will fail under this justification.280 
13. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 
The case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.281 was not about a restriction 
relating directly to corporate political, but it may have implications for such.  Decided 
before Citizens United, the case involved a decision by a West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals judge who declined a recusal motion. The decision would be discussed by both 
the majority and the dissent in Citizens United and may provide additional reasoning 
applied to future corporate political speech cases. 
In 2002, the A.T. Massey Coal Co. (hereafter “Massey”) was found liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and other charges and ordered to pay $50 million in 
compensatory and punitive damages to Hugh Caperton and other plaintiffs (hereafter 
“Caperton”). Massey appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Before 
the appeal was heard, West Virginia held judicial elections in 2004. Don Blankenship, 
Massey’s chairman, donated $2.5 million to a PAC organized to support Brent Benjamin, 
an attorney challenging Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Warren McGraw. In addition, 
Blankenship spent $500,000 on independent expenditures in support of Benjamin, who 
ultimately won the election. 
In 2005, before the Supreme Court of Appeals heard the case, Caperton moved to 
have Justice Benjamin disqualified under the Due Process Clause. Justice Benjamin 
denied the motion, and later joined a 3-2 majority that voted to reverse the judgment 
against Massey.  Caperton sought rehearing and asked for Benjamin and one other justice 
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to disqualify themselves. Massey, additionally, sought disqualification for a justice who 
voted against reversal. The other justices agreed to disqualify themselves, but Justice 
Benjamin refused. The court submitted a modified version of the earlier opinion, which 
was again joined by Justice Benjamin and one other justice, resulting in a 3-2 reversal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a 5-4 vote reversed and remanded the 
decision. 
As in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote the Caperton opinion. Notably, he 
was joined by the four justices who had dissented in Citizens United, while the four 
justices who had joined him in Citizens United dissented in Caperton.  In Caperton, 
Kennedy held that there are “objective standards that require recusal when ‘the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable.’”282 While the majority is careful to point out that “[n]ot every 
campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a 
judge's recusal,”283 they also explain precisely what makes this an exceptional case: “The 
inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of 
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the 
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.”284 The court 
concludes “that Blankenship’s campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.”285 
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The “significant and disproportionate influence” language is repeated several 
times in the majority opinion.286 This is distinct from proving that “Blankenship's 
campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin's victory,” 
which is not the issue.287  This case turned on the “significant and disproportionate 
influence—coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending 
case,” leading the court to conclude that “[o]n these extreme facts the probability of 
actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.”288 
Unlike Citizens United, where there is a debate as to what extent the holding can 
be viewed as an “as applied” decision, Caperton is quite clearly a case decided on its 
“extreme facts.”289 This is a major concern for the dissent, who feels that “[t]he Court’s 
new ‘rule’ provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be 
constitutionally required.”290 While not using the significant and disproportionate 
influence language from the majority, the dissent characterizes the standard as one related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Id. at 2263-64 (““We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by 
raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or 
imminent” (emphasis added); at 2264 “Applying this principle, we conclude that 
Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing Justice Benjamin on the case” (emphasis added); and “In an election decided by 
fewer than 50,000 votes (382,036 to 334,301), … Blankenship's campaign 
contributions—in comparison to the total amount contributed to the campaign, as well as 
the total amount spent in the election—had a significant and disproportionate influence 
on the electoral outcome.” (emphasis added)(citations omitted); at 2265 “We find that 
Blankenship's significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal 
relationship between the election and the pending case—‘ “ ‘offer a possible temptation 
to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and  true.’ ” ’” 
(emphasis added)(citations omitted) (quoting another source). 
287 Id. at 2264. 
288 Id. at 2265 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 2267 (J. Roberts, dissenting) 
	   69	  
to bias and feels that “the standard the majority articulates—‘probability of bias’—fails to 
provide clear, workable guidance for future cases.”291 The dissent raises 40 specific 
questions courts will now have to answer with regard to judicial recusal.292  
There is at least one additional question of interest not raised by the dissent: 
whether the same standard of “significant and disproportionate influence” in an election 
could be used in contexts other than judicial disqualification for purposes of measuring 
the “possibility of bias.” The dissent in Citizens United argues that the Caperton decision 
is proof that “at least in some circumstances, independent expenditures on candidate 
elections will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro quo corruption.”293 The majority 
disagreed, and held that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must 
be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could be banned.”294  
The majority’s distinction appears to mean that the corruption risk of independent 
expenditures is not a compelling state interest for purposes of justifying regulations that 
limit or forbid speech, but that the same interest may justify other actions, including 
requiring judicial disqualification. This would allow those who fear that independent 
expenditures raise the risk of quid pro quo corruption, including congress and the FEC, to 
pursue rules and regulations focused on the quo of favor rather than the quid of speech.  
The majority opinion in Caperton spends significant energy detailing the 
“extreme” nature of the facts before the court. It is unclear if the court would find the 
facts as compelling in a case outside the judiciary, or where the alleged bias was less 
clear than a vote regarding a specific financial judgment. However, the very vagaries that 
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concern the dissent regarding where the line has been drawn can benefit opponents of 
independent expenditures on corporate political speech.  
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Chapter 3: Law and Economics 
Economics has enjoyed a cultural renaissance in recent years. The recession of 
2007 has heightened public awareness of the importance of economics as a discipline, 
and books like Moneyball295 and Freakonomics296 have demonstrated the possibility of 
the application of economic analysis to things beyond financial policy and fiscal 
performance.  
One non-traditional application of economic analysis that has continued to grow 
in popularity is the relationship between law and economics. This chapter discusses the 
intellectual history of the study of law and economics, the related and sometimes 
competing field of behavioral law and economics and some of the external criticisms of 
combining economics with law. The chapter concludes by tracing the application of 
economics to specific legal issues, most notably free speech and the First Amendment.
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Economics can suffer from something of an identity crisis at times. It is most 
often taught in business schools at major universities, but it is also a social science, and, 
as such aspires to more rigorous application of the scientific method than disciplines like 
management or marketing.297 “Economics flaunts its ties with natural science, the last 
surviving authority since God’s recent death. The economists claim that their approach is 
scientific, rational, consistent, unenslaved by tradition.”298 However, like most social 
sciences, it often lacks the verifiable results of repeatable experiments that characterize 
studies like biology and physics.299 When a character in Thomas Love Peacock’s novel 
Crotchet Castle refers to political economy as the “science of sciences”, the main 
character sums up the skeptical view of economics as a science nicely: “Premises 
assumed without evidence, or in spite of it; and conclusions drawn from them so 
logically, that they must necessarily be erroneous.”300 
Because it assumes at its heart that people are rational actors, economics is based 
on an assumption, and “an assumption is not a finding.”301 Because of this, economics is 
on many levels, more like a philosophy.302 Many economists, however, find the label of 
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philosophy to be pejorative, because this characterization makes it something less than a 
science.303 Nonetheless, when asking how economics can apply to law, it is helpful to 
think of it as a way of viewing the world; as a set of assumptions and questions that 
should be at the front of one’s mind when undertaking legal analysis. 
The Origins of Law and Economics 
	  
Ronald Coase’s304 work in the 1960’s in the reason many have called him the 
founding father of law and economics.305 However, many scholars agree that the ideas 
and concepts that are the foundation for this methodological approach emerged long 
before Coase and his work at the University of Chicago. There are three possible 
precedent movements that are worthy of discussion, although not everyone is in 
agreement as to the impact each movement had on the development of the law and 
economics approach.  
1. The philosophers 
The study of the concept of a political economy inspired writers like Adam 
Smith,306 David Hume307 and Adam Ferguson308 to consider the role of law in society and 
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in the protection of liberty. Central to this consideration were the concepts of ownership 
of private property, freedom to contract and protection by the law of private rights. Smith 
in particular considered property ownership to be the central question when determining 
the proper role of the rule of law.309 According to Smith, without property, a person can 
harm another but can rarely benefit from such harm in a direct way.310 With property, 
often the benefit to the person committing the crime is equal to or greater than the harm 
to the victim.311  
Another writer whose works foretold of linking the basic concepts of law and 
economics was Jeremy Bentham.312 Bentham’s axiom that “it is the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” is perfectly in line with the 
economic concepts of rational maximization and equilibrium.313 Although this concept 
predated Bentham’s writing, he was among the first to suggest that this axiom could be 
best brought about through legislation.314  
Bentham believed that the creation of laws should assist individuals in acting so 
as to maximize their own happiness.315 He did not believe this could be left to the 
markets in a laissez-faire manner. As Charles K. Rowley points out, Bentham believed 
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that “[s]elf interest would only lead to the greatest happiness if the laws were correctly 
devised.”316 
These philosophical influences are seen in much of the development of law and 
economics, and there is little debate that Bentham and Smith paved the way for the works 
of Coase and others. There is more debate about the influence of the other antecedent 
movements.  
2. The First Law and Economics Movement 
Some trace the early application of economics to the law to work by European 
and American economists at the end of the 19th century.317 As American legal theory 
began to develop, several, including Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. predicted that more 
methodologically rigid practices resembling math and economics would begin to replace 
the classic legal theories employed in the 1800s.  
For the rational study of the law, the blackletter man may be the man of 
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master 
of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if 
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.318 
 
This was a different time in the study of economics, and many of the assumptions 
upon which later law and economics scholars would rely, were still being debated.319 
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Institutional Economics, as it came to be called, rejected many of the assumptions of 
classical and neoclassical economics and focused instead on the effect that legal 
institutions had on property ownership.320 The primary divergence from the neoclassical 
approach dealt with the rational assumptions of actors and the presumption of common 
traits among all individuals and organizations. “According to the institutionalists, 
economics could not generalize about the behavior of business firms or other 
organizations, or even about the influence of particular sets of legal concepts such as 
contract or property. Each had its own motives and working rules, which required 
individual study.”321  
Institutional Economics is sometimes called Evolutionary Economics, because 
institutionalists were heavily influenced by Charles Darwin and the theory of 
evolution.322 John R. Commons identified the economic approach to the study of 
common law rules as Darwinian: “From the economist's approach, the common law is a 
special case of Darwin's ‘artificial selection,’ by the courts in this instance, of what are 
deemed to be good customs, and the rejection and penalization by the courts of what are 
deemed to be bad customs”.323 
Institutionalists believed that time and history influenced economic decision-
making and felt that classic price theory from neoclassical economics failed to account 
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for this because it treated decision-making as if it happened in a vacuum.324 However, 
institutionalists were not always in agreement about what should replace the rational 
choice of marginal utility as a theory for economic methodology, and as a result, 
substituted a variety of alternative theories of human behavior that had little success in 
winning over economists.325 Eventually, traditional economists felt the methodology of 
instuutionalists was lacking in consistency.326  
‘A much better description of the working methodology of institutionalists 
is storytelling  ... Storytelling makes use of the method that historians call 
colligation, the bundling together of facts, low-level generalizations, high 
level theories, and value judgements [sic] in a coherent narrative, held 
together by a glue of an implicit set of beliefs and attitudes that the author 
shares with his readers’327 
 
Coase took issue with the methodology of institutionalism and rejected the idea 
that it heavily influenced the later application of economics to the law. “The American 
institutionalists were not theoretical but anti-theoretical, particularly where classical 
economic theory was concerned. Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a 
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mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire”.328 For this and other reasons, 
many believe that intuitionalism died out in the 1930s.329 
3. Legal Realism 
If institutionalism failed to carry the day among economists (and as a result failed 
to make a lasting impact on legal theory), it shared some foundational beliefs with a more 
purely legal theory called legal realism, which developed in the early 20th century.330 
Where institutionalism rejected formal economic assumptions about rational actors, legal 
realism rejected legal formalism and the assumption that judges develop the common law 
based on a straight forward interpretation of precedent.331 Legal realists believed that 
legal formalism failed to account for the actual process of judicial decision-making.332 
“By realism they mean fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they are, as 
contrasted with things as they are imagined to be or wished to be or as one feels they 
ought to be. 333 According to Holmes, who is often considered the grandfather of legal 
realism; the law is “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious.” 334 
The central premise of legal realism is that the law is indeterminate, in that one 
can often derive different and conflicting legal responses to the same question.335 
Reliance on human logic and laws and rules that are often ambiguous or even 
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contradictory, and the ability, particularly of judges, to understand a “true” meaning of 
the law was questioned.336 Concepts like “reasonableness” or “duress” are subject to 
broad interpretation.337 Reasonable people familiar with all the legal precedents can 
disagree about what they meant, and therefore predicting judicial outcomes on the basis 
of an understanding of legal precedent is unreliable.338  
A second form of indeterminacy is found in the distinction between holding and 
dicta in judicial decisions.339 Karl N. Llewellyn, one of the leading legal realists, believed 
that judges had such great latitude in determining what was essential to past decisions and 
they could and often did choose which parts of earlier decisions upon which to rely.340 
Legal realists argue that after a time, a common law judge would face two distinct lines 
of precedent that treat similar facts differently based on different interpretations of the 
language in the original decision. This would leave both the judge and the parties 
involved in an indeterminate state in which predicting the “correct” outcome was nearly 
impossible.341 For this reason, they believe that legal rules were of limited use in 
predicting judicial decisions, and that judicial decision-making is idiosyncratic and 
unpredictable.342 
Legal realists looked to “social context, the facts of the case, judges' ideologies, 
and professional consensus” to see how they influence not just individual decisions but 
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patterns of decisions over time.343 Considering these factors help to improve the 
predictability of law.344 
In addition to describing and defining these forms of legal indeterminacy, legal 
realists attempted to understand legal rules in terms of their social consequences.345 In 
this way, legal realism is also normative, in that many of the scholars who have written 
about legal realism wanted to make judicial decision-making more predictable by 
focusing on social reality rather than legal doctrine. To accomplish this, they have 
attempted to unify law and social sciences.346 According to John Dewey, judges had a 
duty to choose legal rules that have desirable social consequences.347 But they also had an 
obligation “to enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the legal import of their 
acts”.348 This requires decisions that “possess the maximum possible … stability and 
regularity”.349 
Some argue that legal realism died in the 1960’s, most notably because of a 
critique of legal realism offered by H.L. Hart.350 Lighter argues that “Hart's devastating 
critique of the Realists in Chapter VII of The Concept of Law rendered Realism a 
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philosophical joke in the English-speaking world.”351  Hart believed the realist view of 
indeterminacy led to circular reasoning that argued judges used the law to predict their 
own decision, but that the law was nothing but a justification for their own decision.352  
Legal realism, however, proved to be a major influence on legal philosophy and 
several other schools of legal theory, including critical legal studies, which is discussed 
below.353 However, there is some debate about whether it should be considered an 
influence on law and economics. To the extent that it advocates a normative approach 
that sought to maximize the law’s effectiveness, the two theories have something in 
common.354 In addition, as Posner argues, judicial behavior is unpredictable and is often 
based on the external factors including social context.355 
One may be able to give reasons for liking or disliking the decision 
… and people who agree with the reasons will be inclined to say that the 
decision is correct or incorrect. But that is just a form of words. The 
problem … is that there are certain to be equally articulate, “reasonable” 
people who disagree and can offer plausible reasons for their 
disagreement, and there will be no common metric that will enable a 
disinterested observer (if there is such a person) to decide who is right.356 
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As much as that may sound like an endorsement of some of the legal 
indeterminacy of legal realism, Posner, in other contexts took pains to distinguish law 
and economics from legal realism. “The ‘crits' worry that the practitioners of law and 
economics will contest with them the mantle of legal realism. They need not worry. We 
economic types have no desire to be pronounced the intellectual heirs of Fred Rodell, or 
for that matter of William Douglas, Jerome Frank, or Karl Llewellyn.”357 Elsewhere, 
Milton Friedman, another scholar associated with the law and economics movement 
remarked that the first tenured economist at the Chicago Law School, Henry Simons, 
“was opposed to almost everything that the institutionalists and legal realists stood 
for.”358 
4. The Chicago School 
After Henry Simons, the next tenured economist at the Chicago Law School was 
Aaron Director.359 Director was the first editor of the Journal of Law and Economics, 
created in 1958.360 Earlier, Director led the way to the merger of law and economics by 
applying economic insights to legal cases, in particular antitrust law.361 After the 
depression and the New Deal, many people believed that industry had to be closely 
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supervised and regulated in order to be effective.362 Director tried to show “this 
conclusion in most cases to be unwarranted, indeed counterproductive: monopoly was 
more often alleged than it was effectively present and detrimental to consumer 
interests.”363 
At the same time Director was looking at antitrust law, many scholars began 
looking at legal subjects with clear economic connotations, like corporate law, 
bankruptcy, taxation and public utilities. Posner and others refer to this body of 
scholarship as “old law and economics”. It was groundbreaking in continuing the 
tradition from the institutionalists of applying economic concepts to legal questions, but 
limited itself to explicitly economic subjects in which supply and demand was clearly a 
component of analysis.  
Posner and others would argue that Coase, who succeeded Director as the editor 
of The Journal of Law and Economics, ushered in the new era of law and economics with 
his article entitled “The Problem of Social Cost”.364 The article was intended to be a 
defense of an earlier article he had written, which had been criticized by some 
economists.365 The larger purpose of the article was to discuss “those actions of business 
firms which have harmful effects on others”.366 According to Coase, the basic 
understanding of these actions was mistaken, because people fail to recognize the 
reciprocal nature of the problem: 
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The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice 
that has been made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which 
A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we 
restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a 
reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The 
real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or 
should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious 
harm.367 
 
The original approach, according to Coase, arose from economists’ loyalty to 
Pigou’s work The Economics of Welfare.368  Coase’s new approach attempted to take the 
utility maximization present in the work of Smith and others and combine it (when 
appropriate) with Bentham’s approach to the role of legislation and the courts. According 
to Coase, the courts should “understand the economic consequences of their decisions 
and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the 
legal position itself, take these consequences into account”.369 Government’s role should 
be to legislate only when it is in a position to more efficiently account for the cost of 
market transactions which may prevent the rearrangement of legal rights.370 
This approach was novel in application to law because the reciprocal approach 
contracted with the traditional causality approach. The Coase approach calls on the legal 
system to place the burden on the least cost avoider, even if that person did not cause the 
harm.371 This approach has ramifications in many areas of law, including a few that have 
not traditionally been associated with economic analysis, like tort law. Another 
significant paper from the same era would addressed just that topic.  
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Guido Calabresi published an article in 1961 focusing on risk distribution.372  
Although this article is not explicitly about the application of economic concepts, “the 
tenor of his paper is that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the 
control of externalities.”373 In this approach, the damage awards of tort cases play the role 
that taxes or regulation play for regulation of external costs.374  
In addition to Director and Coase, another economist in Chicago at the time was 
Gary Becker. Becker, who studied under Milton Friedman,375 did not explicitly apply 
economics to legal questions, but he may have influenced Coase and others with his 
novel application of economics to non-traditional subjects and with his believe that 
economics is a methodology, and not a subject area.376 For Becker, any application of the 
rational actor assumptions that underlie neo-classical economics was appropriate, 
regardless of whether the subject was traditionally one associated with markets.377  
In 1973, influenced by Coase and Becker, Richard A. Posner published his 
textbook  Economic Analysis of Law.378 Almost 40 years later, Posner remains “the most 
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important scholar in law and economics”.379  His text not only addresses traditional areas 
of law and economics like property rights, contract and torts, but expands the approach to 
look at family law, antitrust law, criminal law and the legal process generally, and most 
notably, to constitutional law, and specifically the First Amendment.380 Posner’s text, 
which is still in print and widely used today, and his numerous law review articles have 
continued to expand the scope and assert the value of the study of law and economics. 
How Economics Applies to Law 
	  
One may be surprised that the scholarly disciplines of law and economics which 
existed independently for hundreds of years before scholars began using one to inform 
the other. Although it may be just as likely that one is more surprised that the two 
disciplines would ever complement each other. As others have pointed out, they often 
have viewed the world in different ways. Economics was traditionally “logically 
positivist, scientifically rigorous, and generally indifferent to normative issues.”381 Law 
on the other hand was traditionally “morally oriented” and the concept of the rule of law 
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implied “that we should not try to specify in advance the particular result we want to 
reach in resolving a certain kind of legal dispute, even if science offers us the methods for 
reaching any stated goal.”382 
Economics starts with a basic assumption: that people are rational actors.383 Not 
just in economic transactions, but in all choices and actions.384 As rational actors, people 
seek to maximize their own utility because resources are limited in relation to human 
wants.385 This does not assume that people consciously weigh the cost and benefit of 
every decision, nor does it assume that their assessment of the cost and benefit would be 
accurate were they to undertake such an analysis.386 Rather, people subconsciously make 
choices they believe will maximize their utility, given the information they have about 
the costs and benefits.387  
When rational choices are made in a marketplace, economists believe that the law 
of supply and demand will result in competition and eventually in an equilibrium, 
resulting in an efficient distribution. Efficient competitive markets result in three distinct 
positive outcomes. First, efficient markets allow for perfect allocation of resources.388 
Second, efficient markets allow for maximization of utilization of resources,389 and third, 
competitive markets allow innovation and technology to efficiently diffuse throughout 
society.390  
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1. The law of demand: The inverse relationship between the price of a good and 
the demand for that good. As price goes up, demand goes down. (Fig. 1) Of 
course, demand can be affected by things other than price, so you can have 
situation where demand goes up and this drives prices up. But understanding 
the relationship between price and demand is significant for legal analysis that 
may impact price structure through the assignment of legal rights.391 
2. Equilibrium: This is the state of economic systems when supply and demand 
are equal. In the market, this can happen through competition where a price is 
determined where manufacturer’s supply equals the demand of buyers. (See 
Fig. 2). Legal systems are external influences that can impact equilibrium. 
Absent other external influences, legal rules and regulations can tend to inhibit 
equilibrium, but given the existence of other external influences, laws can be 
used to assist the attainment of equilibrium.392  
3. Tendency of resources to gravitate toward their most valuable uses: 
Equilibrium is significant because economists believe resources tend to 
gravitate toward their most valuable uses, which is desirable. When all 
resources are being utilized in their most valuable way, i.e. by the person who 
values them the most, that is said to be an efficient use.393  
4. Opportunity cost: This describes the basic relationship between scarcity and 
choice. It is necessary to the application of law and economics because it is an 
area where law can neglect the true costs of a transaction. As an example, the 
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true cost of a college education is not just the tuition, but also the wages you 
could have earned by working and not attending college. It is inaccurate to say 
that it costs a person $20,000 to attend college for a year, if in attending full-
time they forego an opportunity to make an additional $20,000. Time is a 
scarce resource, and the choice of college precludes the choice of the job. So 
the true cost is the cost of the choice made ($20,000 tuition) and the loss of 
the benefit from the choice not made ($20,000 salary), so the total cost is 
$40,000. For the law to properly assign rights and obligations, it must 
understand the true cost of choices, including opportunity cost.394 
Applying economic principles to law thus leads to analyzing legal rules to 
determine how best to allow for rational choices in a market.395 If markets were perfect, 
the job of the law would simply be to establish a starting point (initial ownership for 
property, basic rights for individuals) and get out of the way of transactions.396 However, 
economists are aware that markets are rarely perfect.397 Imperfections arise both in the 
ability of individuals of make rational choices and in the ability of markets to sustain 
equilibrium in all situations. Some of the most significant market imperfections for which 
economists must account include: 
1. Monopolies: When only one supplier controls the market, the incentives 
for the supplier to continue to produce until equilibrium is reached 
changes.398 Reduced supply can raise prices and leave profits unaffected, 
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but the market will be less than optimally efficient.399 Monopolies can 
result from legal rules, but they can also arise naturally and thus need to be 
controlled by legal rules.400 Anti-trust laws, one of the first places where 
the study of economics was applied to law, seeks to limit the ability of 
natural and legislative monopolies to manipulate markets.401 
2. Externalities: An externality is an impact of a market transaction on an 
outside party, and can be either good or bad.402 The classic example of 
negative externalities is pollution.403 Absent regulation, the supplier will 
produce goods and consumers will purchase goods, even if the production 
of goods results in pollution, because the benefit of the transaction is 
stronger for the supplier and the purchaser, where the cost of the pollution 
is born by society at large.404 This is inefficient if the economic model that 
measures the value of the original transaction does not account for the 
harm done by the pollution, and can be corrected by regulations which 
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attempt to internalize the externality by forcing either the supplier or the 
purchaser to bear the cost, usually through taxes or fees.405  
3. Information Barriers: Information is necessary for rational choices.406 
However, parties can be prevented from obtaining perfect information by 
a variety of market imperfections. One is asymmetry of information.407 If 
the supplier knows more about the transaction, because it drafted the 
contract or understands the market better, the buyer may make an 
imperfect choice, which can hurt equilibrium.408 One reasons buyers may 
have imperfect information is because of the transaction costs associated 
with obtaining the information.409 High costs may discourage consumers 
from finding the information and may lead to inefficiencies.410 Consumer 
protection laws are often aimed at accounting for these types of 
information barriers.411  
4. Public Goods and Free Riders: It is inefficient for private companies to 
control the supply of goods that cannot benefit some without benefitting 
others.412 The most obvious example is national defense.413 If national 
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defense were privatized, some citizens may feel it was important to pay 
for a powerful military that could defend the nations borders. However, it 
would be impossible for the military to defend only those individuals who 
had paid for the service, and a logical consumer would be unwilling to pay 
for the service if she could wait for others to pay and receive the benefit 
without the cost. All the people benefitting from the good without paying 
are called free-riders.414 Laws can account for this problem by making 
certain goods public goods and spreading the cost for the good out to the 
society at large, usually through taxation.415  
Economic analysis allows legal scholars and lawmakers to understand the impact 
of regulation and legal rulings on market transactions, and to consider the concepts from 
economics that can help design laws that maximize efficiency in specific markets. This is 
why classic law and economics analysis tended to arise in analysis of areas of law that 
were most obviously market driven.  
Freedom of speech and the First Amendment 
	  
The first amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law … abridging 
freedom of speech, or of the press …”.416 In 1919, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
wrote an impassioned dissent in which he said: 
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I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, 
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to 
save the country.417 
 
At first blush, this dedication to vigilance may seem incongruous with an 
economic analysis. As described above, such an analysis would engage in a balancing 
approach, weighing costs and benefits, and attempt to maximize utility, even if that came 
at the expense of speech.  
This conflict is not necessarily problematic, however. As is evident even in 
Justice Holmes proposition in the above dissent, the protection of speech is not absolute 
and therefore some balancing is necessary. That he would feel that it would only be 
appropriate to restrict speech in the context of “an immediate check,” does not mean that 
he is not engaging in a balance. It simply means that Holmes saw the costs of restrictions 
on speech as extremely high as compared to the benefits, unless the benefits involve the 
prevention of an immediate harm.  
This strong defense of freedom of speech would later be echoed in the majority 
opinion of Learned Hand in the case of United States v. Dennis.418 Here the court of 
appeals held that the speech of a group of communist party organizers would have been 
protected even though it advocated a political philosophy that would have eliminated the 
freedom of speech after coming to power. “The First Amendment relating to freedom of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. 
417 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 
418 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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speech protects all utterances, individual or concerted, seeking constitutional changes, 
however revolutionary, by the processes which the Constitution provides.”419  
However, Hand went on to say that the speech here did more than simply 
advocate change by the approved processes, and upheld the convictions of the speakers 
on the ground that their speech presented a “clear and present danger” to the 
government.420 This amounted to a balancing test, as Hand stated: “[N]o longer can there 
be any doubt, if indeed there was before, that the phrase, ‘clear and present danger,’ is not 
a slogan or a shibboleth to be applied as though it carried its own meaning; but that it 
involves in every case a comparison between interests which are to be appraised 
qualitatively.”421 He proposed a formula, wherein the question is “whether the gravity of 
the ‘evil’ i.e., if the instigation sought to be prevented or punished succeeds, discounted 
by its improbability, justifies such an invasion of speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger”.422 Posner proposes that this balancing test can be expressed as a formula: 
In symbols, regulate if but only if B less than PL, where B is the cost of 
the regulation (including any loss from suppression of valuable 
information), P is the probability that the speech sought to be suppressed 
will do harm, and L is the magnitude (social cost) of the harm.423 
 
Reducing a rhetorical balancing test to a formula with variables highlights 
the individuals weights being given to the various factors under consideration. 
Posner then suggests expanding the formula to better reflect the component parts 
and to account for additional externalities that Hand’s formula ignores. Posner’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 Id. at 206.  
420 Id. at 213 
421 Id. 
422 Id.  
423 Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 
8 (1986) (Posner B) 
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formula would look like this: regulate if V+E < P x L/(1 + i)n.424 “V” is the social 
loss from suppressing valuable information and “E” is the legal-error costs 
incurred in trying which information is valuable and which isn’t.425 The rest of the 
formula is a modification to adjust “L” (the magnitude of the social harm) for 
present value.426 Here “i” is an interest or discount rate for translating future 
social cost into present dollar and n is the number of periods between the speech 
and the harm.427 The larger i and n are, the smaller the harm will be.428 According 
to this formula, government should regulate only where the social loss (including 
error costs) is less than the harm caused by the speech, accounting for the 
probability of the speech actually causing harm and adjusting for present value of 
the harm.429  
This example is illustrative in two ways. First, it shows that applying the 
insights of law and economics is not a radical change from traditional legal 
reasoning. Although doubtful that Hand would have described his approach as 
economic, nonetheless, he was balancing costs and benefits and even devised a 
formula to attempt to categorize the variables under consideration. Second, it 
shows that a more conscious consideration of the economic perspective may 
allow an observer to account for additional variables that may be overlooked in a 
less complex balancing approach. Economics is not necessary to create a thorough 
or complex balancing test, but focusing on economic factors allows the legal 
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system to more accurately reflect the goals that the test is being designed to meet. 
Here is how the test would be applied to two important types of speech that 




A defamatory statement is a false statement that tends to harm the 
reputation of another.430 The courts have generally held that this speech is not 
worthy of protection,431 and its reasoning has been fairly consistent with the 
application of a balancing test similar to the one from Dennis above.432 There is a 
high cost in the damage done to reputation (L). And there is a high probability of 
defamatory statements because they are inexpensive to the speaker (P). On the 
other side, the cost to society of restricting the speech is generally considered to 
be low, because defamatory statements are false and therefore of little value 
(B).433 
Applying the more complex Posner formula may change things slightly. 
Two of the variables are not particularly effected, because the harm to reputation 
is usually immediate so time does not discount the likely damage. But the addition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
431 See generally 2 Fowler V. Harper, et al., Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The 
Law of Torts 5.0, at 2-10 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that all states apply a strict liability legal 
regime against authors of defamatory statements); Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 
551 U.S. 177, 127 S.Ct. 2372 (2007)(“[S]peech that is obscene or defamatory can be 
constitutionally proscribed because the social interest in order and morality outweighs the 
negligible contribution of those categories of speech to the marketplace of ideas.”). 
432 Dennis, supra n.73.  
433 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976)(“[I]naccurate and 
defamatory reports of facts [are] matters deserving no First Amendment protection”); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974)(“[T]here is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”). 
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of the variable which consists of the legal-error judgment of which speech is 
valuable and which isn’t may be significant. Although it is true that all defamation 
is false, and that false speech is generally of little value, the challenge here is that 
the speaker may not know the statement is false when the statement is made. 
Although we may normally be fine with allocating this risk to the speaker, 
meaning that the speaker should ensure that the statement is true or be aware that 
the liability for any resultant harm is theirs to bare, this may not always be the 
most efficient scheme. As the court ruled in New York Times v. Sullivan, certain 
information is valuable to the political process, and should be encouraged, though 
it may sometimes be false.434 The imposing of liability for inadvertent false 
statements that may harm the reputation of another may result in speakers being 
overly cautious and choosing not to make statements they believe to be true 
because the truth cannot be guaranteed and the risk of liability is too high.435 
These statements, if actually true, could be valuable to society, and thus the cost 
to society is the lack of access to this information because of the structure of legal 
liability.436 
This is exactly the kind of problem that economic analysis was designed to 
account for, and while the Sullivan decision would again be unlikely to be 
characterized as economic, it incorporates all of the elements of the economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964). 
435 Id.  
436 Id. See also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 
S.Ct. 2678 (1989)(“Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as 
enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of “ 
‘breathing space’ ” so that protected speech is not discouraged.” (citing Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974), (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963)))). 
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approach.  In weighing the costs and benefits of restricting defamatory speech, the 
court considered that certain speech, speech about public figures, was valuable 
enough that the loss of some true speech over fears of liability was a greater cost 
than the benefit of avoiding some false, defamatory speech.437 This externalized 
the cost of this speech onto the defamed individual.438 Whether this is efficient or 
not is a matter of interpretation,439 but it is clear that this is an attempt to account 
for externalities, in this case the chilling of speech because of a fear of liability, 
by redistributing risk to the plaintiff and expanding the protection of the 
defendant. This in theory is exactly how the economic analysis of law should 
proceed.  
2. Copyright 
Copyright law grants a time-limited exclusive right to creators of works of 
expression like music, books, paintings and films.440 This type of intellectual 
property differs from traditional property in that it is generally inexhaustible and 
nonexcludable. To account for the nonexcludable nature of these goods, copyright 
grants the exclusive right to the creator. Without this right, copiers would be able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. , at 271. (“[E]rroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need * * * to survive,’”)(quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
438 POSNER, supra n.301, at 43. 
439 See Ray Ibrahim, Giving the Internet an Acid Bath of Economics: Electronic 
Defamation Viewed Through a New Lens, 2 Va. J.L. & Tech. 5 (1997) (arguing the 
Sullivan distribution is appropriate and further cases that limited this distribution to 
public figures was a missed opportunity), but see also Posner, supra n.301, at 42-
43(arguing that this distribution of risk to individuals does not allow for the spreading of 
costs or the insurance against damage, and arguing Sullivan and subsequent cases 
actually allowed for too much protection in cases involving private individuals). 
440 Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope 
and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 187, 192 (2006) 
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to reproduce the good at a lower cost than the creator by eliminating the creation 
costs. If there is competition among copiers, the price for the good will eventually 
be reduced to the reproduction cost, meaning the creator cannot sell the good 
profitably once the creation cost is accounted for. Creators expecting profit from 
their creation will thus have no incentive to create content without the protection 
of an exclusive right.  
The above analysis could be seen as some of the variables from the 
formula similar to the ones discussed above. The countervailing consideration 
would be the costs associated with the granting of an exclusive right to content 
creators.441 A few of those costs are: 
i. Monopoly power and thus monopoly pricing: It was mentioned above 
that creative intellectual property is both inexhaustible and 
nonexcludable.442 The nonexcludability was discussed above as a 
factor that supported the creation of copyright. The inexhaustibility of 
the creation tends to cut the other way.443 Because it is inexhaustible, 
all consumers who were interested in consuming the product could do 
so with competitive pricing.444 Unlike a physical good, like a car, 
which can only be sold to one person, intellectual property can be sold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 WENDY J. GORDON & ROBERT G. BONE, COPYRIGHT, IN 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT & GERRIT DE 
GEEST EDS., 2000) 
442 Sag, supra n.102. 
443 GORDON & BONE, supra n.103, at 194. 
444 Id. 
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to numerous people at the low cost of duplication.445 One consequence 
of monopoly pricing is usually that not everyone who would be willing 
to purchase the good does, because the price does not reach 
equilibrium.446 When the alternative would be a low cost equilibrium 
because of the inexhaustibility of the product, this cost is particularly 
high.447  
ii. Chilling future creativity: Sullivan was concerned that defamation 
liability would prevent some people from publishing information 
because of the fear that it could be defamatory and that this fear would 
cost society access to non-defamatory information that would have 
created a social benefit.448 The same argument can be made here. 
Future content creators who may wish to build on previously existing 
work may be less likely to create works for the fear that they could 
infringe on copyright and thus create liability on behalf of the 
creator.449 Copyright attempts to account for this cost by limiting the 
protection to the expression and providing no protection for the 
underlying ideas.450 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 In the author’s opinion, this is one reason why efforts by content creators (like the 
motion picture industry) to equate copyright piracy of intellectual property with 
traditional theft fail. Much of the audience may be able to understand that from a moral 
perspective there is no difference, but from a practical perspective it seems quite different 
in that their piracy does not deny anyone of their use of the music or movie.  
446 GORDON & BONE, supra n. 103, at 194. 
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448 Sullivan, supra n.99. 
449 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 
J. Legal Stud. 325, 332-44 (1989) 
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Other costs include transaction costs affiliated with granting licenses451 and the 
cost of administration and enforcement. 452 These costs are balanced against the benefits 
to society from granting the exclusive right, and the legislature (as copyright is a 
legislative creation) and the courts interpreting the copyright regulations have attempted 
to strike a balance. Two important aspects of copyright law work to balance the costs of 
the grant of copyright: the limited duration of copyright and exceptions to the protection, 
most notably the fair use exception.  
The limited duration is justified on the fact that the social cost increases the longer 
the exclusive right is granted.453 One reason for this increase may be the additional 
transaction costs associated with locating copyright holders after a greater passage of 
time.454 Another justification is the fact that the effect on ex ante incentives (meaning the 
desire to create the work initially) is dramatically lessened with the passage of time, as 
most creators would discount future economic return to present value.455  
The other notable balance against the social cost of copyright grants is the 
exception for fair use.456 Fair use is a defense that can be raised against claims of 
copyright infringement and is available in situations where the use is seen as being of 
specific benefit to the public, yet it would be unrealistic or impractical for the market to 
determine the value of the use.457 Market failure means that the granting of a provisional 
license through the fair use exception should allow the use of the material without 
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453 Landes & Posner, supra n.449. 
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455 GORDON & BONE, supra n.103, at 194. 
456 Id. at 200 
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substantial cost to the creator, since the market was unlikely to exist or be particularly 
lucrative.458 Examples include use of protected material for news broadcasts, educational 
purposes or parody.459 Each of these uses is an example where the traditional licensing 
market may not be efficient.460 News use often has to happen in a timely manner, and the 
users are unlikely to have time to contact copyright holders and negotiate use.461 
Educational use is often limited in scope, and the transaction costs associated with 
seeking copyright permission is likely to outweigh the benefit to the educator of a 
specific use.462 And lastly, parody can often put the material or even the creator in a 
negative light, and therefore copyright holders may be more reluctant to grant licenses.463 
Yet parody (like the other uses above) is considered a socially useful and is thus 
encouraged.464  
Critiques of Law and Economics 
	  
Several scholars are critical of or have reservations about the application of 
economics to law. From a philosophical standpoint, the school of Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) developed largely as a response to the claimed objectivity and neutrality of the law 
and economics movement.465 CLS attempted to adapt from the legacy of the Legal 
Realists the idea that law is indeterminate. However, CLS goes further than pointing out 
ambiguity in legal language, and believes that the basic idea of rational determinacy is 
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459 Sag, supra n.102, at 247. 
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461 Landes & Posner, supra n.449. 
462 GORDON & BONE, supra n. 103, at 202. 
463 Sag, supra n.102, at 248. 
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465 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
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false.466 Legal reasoning and decisions are not separate from political beliefs and 
dialogue, and as such, the law is a political tool that cannot be understood as distinct from 
other forms of subjective value determinations like politics.467 CLS sees an inherent 
conflict between law and rules that protect individual freedom and a system that supports 
communal security.468 As such, many CLS scholars advocate for dramatic change in 
approaches to legal rules and recognition of the fact that law is inferior and subordinate to 
social theory.469 
 CLS scholars were critical of the “individual choice” focus of law and economics 
and of the focus on individual maximization.470 The battle between CLS and Law and 
Economics has been the subject of much study,471 and CLS is interesting in its own right, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 See Jonathan Turley, Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in Constructive Social 
Theory: Introduction: The Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 593, 594 (1987) (“At its most basic level, the CLS movement challenges 
society to consider some ultimate questions about the validity of its own institutions and 
to reconsider some past ‘ultimate answers' upon which those institutions are based.”) 
467 MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) 
468 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 205, 211-12 (1979). 
469 See Kelman, supra n.467. 
470 See e.g. Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal 
Studies, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 465 (1998) 
(highlighting distributional implications of mainstream law and economics thought 
generally); Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach Contracts and What 
Socioeconomics Can Do About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55, 58 (2004) (“Law and 
economics in its early form asked legislators and, most often, judges to make decisions 
on the basis of efficiency, while critical legal studies asked them to base their decisions 
on a concern for social justice.”); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). 
471 See e.g. Gary Minda, The Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies Movements 
in American Law , in Law and Economics 87 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989); Linda A. 
Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate Between Critical Legal 
Studies and Law And Economics , 20 Hofstra L. Rev . 1105, 1105-07 (1992). 
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472 but I choose here to focus in more depth on other criticisms of law and economics. If 
one agrees with the CLS assertion that law cannot be developed as a rationally 
determined body with some objective and agreeable truth, than there is little point in 
continuing to discuss how economic ideas can make law more efficient. So I choose to 
focus on concerns that are more about the way we conceptualize law and economics, 
because these critiques are significantly altering the way law and economics is applied, 
but do not leave us feeling that the application is futile.473 
Before I address the specific criticisms of behavioral law and economics, I would 
also like to address one other concern about law and economics. At a base level, as we 
mentioned in the introduction, economics walks a fine line between philosophy and 
science. To the extent that economic analysis claims superiority on the basis of being 
more “scientific”, there are valid criticisms.474  
Science is often thought of as a process where knowledge is gradually added to 
better understand a phenomena. In his landmark book, The Structure of Scientific 
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important social theories like critical race theory. For a bibliography of Critical Legal 
Studies, see Duncan Kennedy and Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal 
Studies, 94 Yale L.J. 461 (1984). 
473 This approach is justified by recent evidence that Critical Legal Studies is fading from 
legal scholarship; Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review 
Articles of All Time, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1483, 1490 (2012). “In contrast to the staying 
power of law and economics, the critical legal studies (“CLS”) and critical race theory 
(“CRT”) movements have faded in acceptance.”; Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal 
Scholarship Today: A Comment on Schlag, 97 GEO. L.J. 845 (2009) (“The ‘Law and ...’ 
wave has, it is true, crested. Many of the new fields of the 1970s have either disappeared 
(in the case of critical legal studies), or stalled, as in the case of constitutional theory, 
feminist law, and critical race theory.”) 
474 Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the 
Economic Analysis of the Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 
1260, 1261 (1981) (“Economics flaunts its ties with natural science, the last surviving 
authority since God’s recent death. The economists claim that their approach is scientific, 
rational, consistent, unenslaved by tradition.”) 
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Revolutions,475 Thomas Kuhn pointed out that, at any given period in time, scientific 
knowledge is accumulated and viewed within a present paradigm.476 The problem, is that 
these paradigms tend to undergo periodic revolutionary change that creates a new 
paradigm where much of what has been “learned” or “understood” is debunked or 
falsified.477 An additional concern is that Kuhn found that the prevailing paradigm at any 
time is not determined by logical deduction but by a mix of sociology, enthusiasm and 
scientific promise.478 
This concern over the cloak of objectivity often surrounding disciplines perceived 
as scientific has troubled legal scholars who fear that the application of economics to 
legal theory is appealing in large part because of this perceived objectivity.479 Of 
particular concern is the fact that the perceived objectivity of economics is obscuring a 
paradigm with regards to political or ideological views regarding distribution of wealth 
and the role of government.480 Therefore, all applications of economic theory to law must 
proceed with the humility brought on by understanding that current assumptions about 
economic models may prove to be false or may need to adjust for changes in our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3D ED. 1996) 
476 Id. 
477 Id. 
478 Id.  
479 See e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER THE COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2006); Ugo Mattei, A Theory of 
Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 Ind. J. Global 
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finally unseated from the throne of legal objectivity, so that its normative recipes need a 
new contingent and local legitimization in order to compete with those of a variety of 
opposite political strategies.”); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal 
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 689-90 (1985). 
480 Hackney, supra n.479.  
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understanding of human behavior. Law and Economics is currently going through just 
such a paradigm shift, and the implications of that movement are discussed below.  
Behavioral Law and Economics 
	  
The next set of related criticisms involve the underlying assumption at the heart of 
economic analysis: rational choice. Advocates for law and economics believe that the law 
should use the basic assumption that people are autonomous rational actors that make 
choices to maximize their satisfaction to model legal decision and legislation. But what if 
that underlying assumption about people is wrong?  
In 1979 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky wrote an article entitled Prospect 
Theory, which was modeled as a more accurate predictor of behavior than one built on 
expected utility.481 This theory helped to explain why people will behave differently 
depending on whether they are seeking to reap gain or avoid losses.482 This distinction in 
how the actor “frames” the event will impact the choice the person makes, even though 
the two choices may be logically inconsistent.483 Essentially, losses hurt more than gains 
feel good.484 One example would be that people are more likely to insure against a 1% 
chance of losing $1000 than they are to purchase a 1% chance to gain $1000. Under 
expected utility, the person would only be concerned about absolute wealth and would 
not be more averse to losing $1000 than to gaining $1000.485 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). 
482 Id.  
483 Id. 
484 Id. 
485 Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, 107 Econ. J. 1832-1847 
(1997). 
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This idea of framing would become a key concept in the growing field of 
behavioral economics. It mirrors in many respects research about framing effects from 
communications and media research. Research has identified both media and individual 
frames. The media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to 
interpret and discuss public events,486 and the audience employs cognitive devices that 
operate as categories into which any future news content can be filed.487 The 
communications research does not describe the behavior of the media as intentionally 
manipulative or the behavior of the audience as irrational. However, many of the 
concepts that Kahneman and others found in human decision making are reflected in 
literature on the choices of media consumers, and the concerns expressed later about 
corporate political speech reflect the ability, if not the intention, of speakers to 
manipulate messages to impact behavior.488  
Kahneman in particular would continue his research into the psychology of choice 
and apply it to behavioral economics in his work with Richard Thaler.489 In addition to 
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  Gaye Tuchman, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY ix 
(1978). 
487	  Robert E. Entman, Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. 
Commun. 51, 54 (1993). 
488	  For	  more	  on	  media	  framing	  theory	  see	  Entman,	  supra	  n.487;	  William A. Gamson 
& Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinions on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist Approach, 95 Am. J. Soc. 1 (1989); Erving Goffman, FRAME ANALYSIS: 
AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 (Ne. Univ. Press 1986) (1974);  
489 See for example Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness and the 
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S290 (1986); Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in 
the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & 
Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Economic Analysis 
and the Psychology of Utility: Applications to Compensation Policy, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 
341-46 (1991); Richard H. Thaler, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman & Alan Schwartz, 
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his work with Kahneman, Thaler made several other contributions to the field of 
behavioral economics, including two books that outlined further problems with the 
rational actor assumption.490 These books pointed out issues like herd behavior, where 
people imitate the actions of others rather than trusting their own information and status 
quo bias, that people prefer to maintain the status quo rather than choosing another path 
which would bring about change, even if that change has a high likelihood of being 
positive.491 
Legal scholars began to take these insights and apply behavioral economics to the 
construction of law.492 In a relationship that recalls the work of Posner and Becker, 
Thaler than worked with a lawyer, Cass Sunstein, on a book that focused on how law can 
account for the way that human decision-making consistently deviates from the rational 
choice model.493 Their work, and the work of others incorporating the ideas of behavioral 
economics have become known as Behavioral Law and Economics.494  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 112 Q. J. 
Econ. 647, 647-48 (1997). 
490 RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS ( 1991). 
491 THALER, THE WINNERS CURSE, SUPRA. 
492 SEE, E.G., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (CASS SUNSTEIN ED., 2001). 
493 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Sunstein was appointed to Obama’s staff 
similar to the time of the release of the book, See Jonathan Weisman & Jess Bravin, 
Obama's Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a New Tone, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A4, 
available at http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB123138051682263203.html 
494 Much as economics has enjoyed a renaissance in the popular media, so has behavioral 
economics and behavioral law and economics, see THALER AND SUNSTEIN, supra n.493; 
See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 239 (Rev. ed. 2009); CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE 
INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010); DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
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Behavioral law and economics attempted to add to the basic assumptions of law 
and economics several other key understandings of human behavior.495 One of these is 
bounded rationality.496 Simply put, bounded rationality describes the fact that human 
beings do not have infinite cognitive ability and therefore their choices will be made with 
limited understanding of costs and benefits.497 This means that any model that assumes 
choices made with perfect information will fail to predict human behavior.498 A similar 
concept is the concept of bounded willpower.499 People may at times act in a manner that 
is not utility maximizing, because of a disconnect between their intellectual desires and 
their physical desires.500 This helps to explain why a person would pay money to join a 
gym, yet never attend and exercise, or why a person who has paid to undertake a program 
to quit smoking would continue to smoke in defiance of the program they voluntarily 
paid for.501 A final limitation is bounded self-interest.502 While rational actor theory may 
suppose that people will act in their own best interest, often people do act contrary to 
their own best interest in order to benefit others.503 
Behavioral law and economics took a normative approach similar to that of 
traditional law and economics, and Thaler and Sunstein coined the phrase “libertarian 
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496 CHRISTINE JOLLS, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & RICHARD H. THALER, A BEHAVIORAL 
APPROACH TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 13, IN BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (CASS 
SUNSTEIN ED., 2001) 
497 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99, 99 
(1955). 
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paternalism”.504 This seemingly oxymoronic idea represented the role of the government 
in accounting for bounded rationality and other cognitive biases.505 In their view, legal 
interventions should both (1) increase the individual's economic welfare by accounting 
for the limitations of his cognitive biases and (2) change the individual's behavior without 
limiting his choices. Regulation should improve economic welfare by more closely 
aligning each individual's actual choices with his unbiased preferences without reducing 
the choices available to him.506 
Although some traditional law and economics scholars have debated the true 
value of the behavioral law and economics insights to regulation,507 several have 
acknowledged that these insights do not render the study of law and economics 
obsolete,508 nor do the two concepts need to be contradictory.509 All of them can be 
accounted for with a proper understanding of the legitimate role law and economics has 
to play. The initial criticisms simply warn against believing that law and economics is 
somehow objective and therefore superior to other legal theories. As discussed above, 
when law and economics is properly scene as a philosophy, the concerns about cloaking 
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507 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its 
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1033 (2012). 
508 Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. 
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law and economics scholarship in a false cover of objectivity or science should be 
accounted for.  
The later observations of prospect theory and behavioral economics can be seen 
as simply adding to the nature of our understanding of what a rational actor is.510 As 
mentioned above, rational need not mean perfect or omniscient, and law and economics 
need not fail as a philosophy because it cannot accurately predict all behavior.511 To the 
extent that traditional law and economics analysis ignored concepts like risk aversion, 
herd behavior or bounded rationality, future models should be constructed to account for 
these aspects of human behavior.512 But as concepts they do not contradict the idea of a 
rational actor as much as they highlight certain ways in which psychology can affect our 
understanding of what is rational. In our next section, we will incorporate the lessons of 
behavioral law and economics into the traditional law and economics assessment of Free 
Speech developed by Posner, and apply the adjusted model to the corporate political 
speech at issue in cases like Citizens United. 
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512 See THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, F. PARISI & V. SMITH (eds.) 
(2005). 
	   112	  
Chapter 4: The Law and Economics of Corporate Political Speech 
This chapter builds on research applying economic principles to speech generally 
and then uses these principles to identify and define the variables courts and 
commentators have considered in debating the application of the First Amendment 
protection to corporate political speech. First, the marketplace of ideas concept is 
revisited and then the significance of this concept to the application of economic 
principles to free speech analysis is examined. Next, the marketplace concept is 
employed to isolate the various aspects of corporate political speech that courts and 
commentators have used to justify their position on regulation of such speech. This 
analysis is specifically focused on three key variables that are consistently mentioned in 
decisions and commentary and that fit within the market of ideas framework: the speech 
itself, the speaker, and the audience. This chapter concludes with the plugging of these 
variables into Posner’s free speech formula in an attempt to create a complete and 
simplified understanding of the issues at hand in cases involving corporate political 
speech. 
The Marketplace of Ideas 
	  
    [W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
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ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate 
is the theory of our Constitution.513 
 
The “marketplace of ideas” as a model for First Amendment analysis was first 
suggested by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the above quotation, with his language about 
a “free trade in ideas.”514 Holmes’ basic concept is that the best available method for 
determining truth is to allow individuals freely to evaluate ideas and see which ideas 
carry the day.515  
Although specific individuals may disagree, the stronger ideas will endure over 
time and the wisdom of the crowd will correct for individual mistakes.516 Free from 
government regulation, ideas, even ideas that people find abhorrent, evil and offensive, 
can compete and be evaluated on their merits and the truth embodied within them.517 
Discussion and debate will expose the weaknesses of bad ideas and allow the better more 
truthful ideas to win out.518  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
514 A similar sentiment can be found much earlier in the first inaugural address of 
Thomas Jefferson. “If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to 
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with 
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. Thomas 
Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in Writings 492, 493 (Merrill D. 
Peterson ed. 1984). 
515 Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1 (2011) 
516 See Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic 
Expression, 17 Comm. L. & Pol'y 21, 24-29 (2012) (arguing that in order “[t]o properly 
function, public discussion must exist in an open, self-regulating marketplace”). 
517 W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40, 40 (1996). 
518 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
Calif. L. Rev. 2353, 2363 (2000)  (“The theory of the marketplace of ideas focuses on 
‘the truthseeking function’ of the First Amendment.”). 
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The Supreme Court has often embraced the marketplace of ideas concept,519 
including in many cases dealing with corporate political speech.520 Although the justices 
have rarely applied it with specific reference to economic reasoning, the concept has 
naturally proven attractive to many legal scholars, particularly those in the law and 
economics tradition.521 It is an explicit example of the possibility of applying market 
concepts to activities that take place outside a recognized commercial market.522   
As critics have pointed out, the validity of the concept of a marketplace of ideas 
requires several assumptions. First and foremost is the idea that “truth” as a concept, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 320-21 (1977)  (Stevens, J., 
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that which is useful or beautiful from what which is ugly or worthless”); Whitney v. 
California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)  (Brandies, J., concurring) (praising the “power of 
reason as applied through public discussion”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 
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Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011). (Breyer, J. dissenting)(“These test-
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marketplace of ideas”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)  (“It is 
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520 See e.g. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 908 (“Austin interferes with the “open 
marketplace” of ideas protected by the First Amendment.”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 494 (2007)( “Under these circumstances, ‘[m]any persons, rather than 
undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights 
through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech—
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.’”(Scalia, J. concurring)(quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 
119, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003)); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765 (1978)(“Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of 
the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.” (White, J. 
dissenting). 
521 See Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & Econ. 1 
(1964); R. H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 384, 385 (1974); Posner, supra n.423; See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk 
Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2003). 
522 Coase, supra n.521. 
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exists and can be discovered in some objective way.523 This aligns with the general 
negative critique of law and economics that it asserts a false sense of objectivity.524 Some 
have argued that information is not inherently true, and that this type of reasoning can 
result in post-hoc rationalization that if an idea wins the day than it must have been the 
best and most true idea.525  
Another criticism is that the marketplace, like economic theory in general, relies 
to some degree, like economic theory in general, on the ability of individuals to make 
rational decisions when faced with multiple choices.526 If people are not capable of 
choosing the “best” idea, than a marketplace of choices fails to produce the desired 
result.527 Some of the specific theories for the failure of individuals to make these choices 
are discussed above in the discussion of behavioral law and economics, and will be 
revisited in the section on the audience for corporate political speech below.  
Even if it is assumed that truth is attainable, and, more importantly, attainable by 
the rational choices of individuals, there is still an objection to the idea that “maximizing 
true ideas” is the only possible justifications for allowing freedom of speech in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J., 1, 31 (‘Truth and understanding are actually nothing more than preconditioned 
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524 See Hackney, supra n.479. 
525 Benjamin S. Duval, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth, 41 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 161, 191 (1972)(‘The difficulty is that any proof that existing beliefs are 
more accurate than past beliefs is inherently circular.’). 
526 See Ingber, supra n.523 (“citizens must be capable of making determinations that are 
both sophisticated and intricately rational if they are to separate truth from falsehood. On 
the whole, current and historical trends have not vindicated the market model's faith in 
the rationality of the human mind. . . .”) 
527 Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the 
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 649 (2006). 
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society.528 For example, this conception pays little heed to the value of self-expression in 
allowing individuals to understand themselves.529 Expressed as either self-realization or 
self-actualization, this theory would place the value of the expression as benefitting the 
speaker, not the audience.530 Any value to society would be secondary.531  
One strong advocate of the value of speech for the sake of self-realization and 
individual liberty was John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, the domain of human liberty  
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; 
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and 
publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs 
to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, 
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in 
great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.532 
 
Mill therefore gave great defference to the right of an individual to express ideas, even 
ideas rejected by the rest of society. “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and 
only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in 
silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind.”533 This did not mean that the government could never suppress speech. Mill 
allowed that suppression could be necessary to avoid harm. “[T]he only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 15-16 
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529 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). 
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531 C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976-77). 
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ed., 1998) (1859). 
533	  Id. at 16.  
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against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”534 Mill, therefore, approaches the value of 
freedom of speech from an individual liberty perspective and still determines that the 
value must be balanced against potential harm to others, with great deference to the 
importance of freedom of speech. 
A final question from critics of the marketplace model is the asks, if the 
marketplace is in ideas, should protection apply to only political ideas or should creative, 
scientific and other ideas should be included?535 If creative ideas need to be allowed to 
compete, how would that align with the court’s treatment of obscenity, for example?536  
With all of these concerns about the appropriateness and feasibility of a 
marketplace model, why has it endured? It has been invoked many times in Supreme 
Court decisions, most recently in 2012.537 Perhaps the “marketplace of ideas” is an 
imperfect model for the value of the First Amendment, but perhaps it is less imperfect 
than the alternatives. One commentator analogized to Winston Churchill’s famous 
remark about democracy, “[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
Government—except all those others that have been tried from time to time.”538  
The Marketplace Variables of Corporate Political Speech 
	  
1. Speech 
The particular product involved in a market transaction can have a significant 
influence on the view the law takes of the value of the transaction. The sale of bread is 
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  Id.	  at	  9.	  	  
535 Baker, supra n.531 at 25. 
536 Ingber, supra n.523 at 22-25. 
537 U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012)(plurality opinion) 
538 Brazeal, supra n.515, quoting from Winston S. Churchill, Speech Before the House of 
Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-
1963, at 7566 (Robert Rhodes ed., 1974). 
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treated differently from the sale of firearms, which are treated differently from the sale of 
marijuana. Not all products are seen as socially useful, and the law has stepped in to 
regulate the market more directly when the item involved has potential social harm. 
The marketplace of ideas is no different. While the products in the marketplace 
can all broadly be labeled speech, certain types of speech are seen as less socially useful, 
and as a result, have been more heavily regulated.539 The courts have generally allowed 
more leeway in regulating speech of “low value”, despite the broad and generic 
protection provided by the language of the First Amendment.540 Pornography has been 
determined to have no protection under the first amendment.541 Commercial speech, 
(speech “doing no more than proposing a commercial transaction”), has been granted 
limited protection, and although the standard has shifted, has consistently been afforded 
less protection than more valuable forms of speech of more societal value.542  
The most valuable form of speech, according to consistent reasoning used by the 
Supreme Court in a variety of contexts, is political speech. It is for this very reason that 
the subject of this dissertation is the rather inelegantly phrased as “corporate political 
speech”, because it relates to the attempts by legislators and members of the executive 
branch to limit speech of a political nature, when spoken by certain speakers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992), citing Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). )“[S]uch expression constitutes ‘no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.’”) 
540 Id. (“…the ordinance bars only low-value speech, namely, fighting words.”) 
541 U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008). (“We have long held that obscene 
speech—sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of decency—is not 
protected by the First Amendment.”) 
542 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
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In Buckley, the only one of our cases above that affected individuals as well as 
corporations, the political nature of the speech is the most significant and controlling 
aspect of the case. 
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of 
the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public 
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. 
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political 
expression in order “to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” … 
Although First Amendment protections are not confined to “the exposition 
of ideas,” … “there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose 
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs. . . . of course includ(ing) discussions of candidates . . . .”543 
 
This language not only gives strong preference to political speech, it implies that 
political speech may be considered the only type of speech that qualifies as “the 
exposition of ideas”.544 Therefore, the concept of the marketplace of ideas would be 
designed to allow people to engage in free trade of political speech.  
As discussed above, the justices in Bellotti believed the nature of the speech was 
controlling as well, and highlighted that the speech in question was of the most important 
category, although the term used was “governmental affairs” rather than “political 
speech”. As the Court noted: 
“there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” If 
the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the 
State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true 
because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. 
The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (internal citations omitted) 
544 Id. 
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public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual.545 
 
In Austin, in which limitations on corporate political speech were upheld, the 
Court began by stating that the threshold question was whether the legislation burdened 
political speech. “Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is “speech”; 
said the Court and indicated that independent campaign expenditures were “political 
expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms.’”546 Because the speech was political in nature, the Court subjected the 
legislation to strict scrutiny, and only upheld the legislation because of concerns about 
special characteristics of the corporate speakers.547 
In Citizens United, the Court again highlighted the idea that political speech is the 
most significant form of speech under the First Amendment. “The right of citizens to 
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus” said the Court, “is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The 
First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a 
campaign for political office.’”548 In fact, the Court raised the suggestion that “it might be 
maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical 
matter”,549 but decided instead to apply the framework from previous cases applying 
strict scrutiny to laws infringing on political speech. 550 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 776-777 (internal citations omitted).  
546 Austin, 494 U.S. at 657 (internal citations omitted).  
547 See supra n.161-204 and accompanying discussion.  
548 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (internal citations omitted).  
549 Id. at 340.  
550 Id. (“the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient framework for protecting 
the relevant First Amendment interests in this case. We shall employ it here.”) 
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Commentators have generally agreed that political speech is of the highest value. 
In fact, several commentators have argued that political speech may be the only type of 
speech that deserves protection, and that once speech is no longer contributing to the goal 
of using the “marketplace of ideas” to improve democracy, the question of whether the 
First Amendment applies at all is much closer.551  
Because of the normative aspect of law and economics, it is not enough to ask if 
the Court has protected political speech. The proper question is whether protecting 
political speech actually assists the stated goal, which, under the “marketplace of ideas” 
framework, is the discovery of truth. With this goal in mind, the next question is how the 
courts should treat false political speech. Does political speech only have value in the 
market if it is true? Can the market be expected to account for the truth or falsity of 
speech?  
Truth was at the center of much of the discussion during the 2012 Presidential 
election.552 It was also at the center of recent Supreme Court case that did not deal 
directly with political speech.553 However, the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on 
a case involving false political speech in the context of an election or other overtly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 See e.g. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477 
(2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American 
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev. 491 (2011); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948); C. Edwin Baker, Is 
Democracy a Sound Basis?, 97 Va. L. Rev. 515 (2011); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and 
Free Speech, 27 Const. Comment. 251 (2011); James Weinstein, Free Speech and 
Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 Const. Comment. 361, 366 (2011). 
552 See Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 
Mont. L. Rev. 53 (2013) (“It is perhaps no coincidence that the recent election season 
saw both a rise in the amount of arguably false campaign speech and the proliferation of 
journalistic “fact checkers” who regularly rate statements made by candidates and 
campaigns.”) 
553 U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012) 
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political activity.554 In dicta from one case, the Supreme Court does state that 
“demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner 
as truthful statements.”555 To defend this proposition, the Court cited Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.,556 a case involving defamation. However, the Court also cited favorably to 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,557 another defamation case in which the court ruled that 
defamatory statements, which are by definition false, need to be given “breathing space” 
when offered in “free debate” about political ideas.558 
State courts and appellate courts have split on whether First Amendment 
protection applies to false political speech. In 2011, the Eighth Circuit considered a 
Minnesota law that made it a crime to engage in false campaign speech.559 The court 
rejected the idea that false speech received less protection and remanded the proceedings 
to see if the Minnesota law could meet the strict scrutiny test reserved for fully protected 
speech.560 The court said: 
 
We do not, of course, hold today that a state may never regulate false 
speech in this context. Rather, we hold that it may only do so when it 
satisfies the First Amendment test required for content-based speech 
restrictions: that any regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government interest.561 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 The legislation in Alvarez could have applied in political contexts, and the Court’s 
discussion of this will be part of the discussion of Alvarez.  
555 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982). 
556 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
557 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
558 Id. at 271-272. 
559 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011) , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 
(2012). 
560 Id.  
561 Id. at 636.  
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Twenty years prior to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, the Sixth Circuit upheld 
provisions of an Ohio statute that allowed for the reprimand of candidates who made 
false statements with actual malice.562 “[Supreme Court] cases indicate that false speech, 
even political speech, does not merit constitutional protection if the speaker knows of the 
falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth,”563 said the court. However, the Supreme 
Court of Washington twice struck down similar laws, although the court divided 
bitterly.564 Among the rationales on both sides, was language similar to the discussion of 
the marketplace of ideas found elsewhere. Two different opinions questioned the value of 
“calculated lies,” and determined that such statements were not entitled to protection of 
the First Amendment.565 However, Justice Sanders was more concerned with the role the 
state intended to play in determining what constituted a lie, and preferred to trust the 
“marketplace”. He said: 
Ultimately, the State's claimed compelling interest to shield the public 
from falsehoods during a political campaign is patronizing and 
paternalistic . . . . It assumes the people of the state are too ignorant or 
disinterested to investigate, learn and determine for themselves the truth or 
falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself 
to fill this void.566 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commn., 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). 
563 Id. at 577. (citing Sullivan). 
564State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 
1998); Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Commn., 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007) (For a full 
discussion of the cases and the opinions see Hasen, supra n.552, William P. Marshall, 
False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285 (2004). 
565 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 699 (Guy, J. concurring)(“Calculated lies are not 
protected political speech. The elected representatives of the people have the right to pass 
laws which make malicious lying illegal in political campaigns; we have no constitutional 
duty to strike down such laws.”); at 701 (Talmadge, J. concurring)( “[We are] the first 
Courtin the history of the Republic to declare First Amendment protection for calculated 
lies,”). 
566 Id. at 698-699. 
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All of these decisions are in question following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in U.S. v. Alvarez.567 Although that case did not involve political speech, 
the language of the Court’s plurality opinions have much to say on the general 
standing of false statements under the First Amendment. Alvarez had publicly 
stated that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, which was 
false.568 This statement violated the Stolen Valor Act.569 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First Amendment.570 The Tenth Circuit had 
upheld the Act in a separate case,571 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the split.  
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by three other justices, began by 
listing the categories of speech that can be restricted based on their content.572 
Content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted only for a few historic 
categories of speech, said Kennedy, including incitement, obscenity, defamation, 
speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called fighting words, child pornography, 
fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the 
Government has the power to prevent.573 According to Kennedy, false speech, as 
a category, has never been accepted by the Court.574 “This comports with the 
common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 
568 Id. at 2543. 
569 18 U.S.C. § 704. 
570 U.S. v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) , 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011) 
571 U.S. v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012) 
572 Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2544. 
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an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, 
expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.”575  
Kennedy stressed that existing regulations of false speech focused on the 
specific harm caused by the false speech.576 Many, like defamation and fraud, 
focus on financial loss or other harms.577 The laws prohibiting false testimony, 
giving false statements to the government and falsely claiming to be a government 
officer, all protect the integrity of the government.578 But the Stolen Valor Act, 
according to Kennedy, “targets falsity and nothing more.”579  
The analysis may be different if the speech was aimed at financial or other 
gain. “Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other 
valuable considerations, say offers of employment,” said Kennedy, “it is well 
established that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First 
Amendment.”580 But in Alvarez, the harm was more in the way of general 
perception. Apparently Kennedy believes that the market can correct for the false 
statement. “The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counter-
speech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”581 
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Kagan, provided the other 
votes to hold that the act violated the Constitution.582 However, Breyer indicated 
that the plurality’s approach of “strict categorical analysis” was problematic and 
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580 Id. at 2547. 
581 Id. at 2549. 
582 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
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proposed a balancing approach to regulations of false speech, which he likened to 
“intermediate scrutiny”.583 This test would consider “the seriousness of the 
speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and importance of 
the provision's countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision will 
tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways 
of doing so.”584 
Breyer agreed with the plurality that certain limitations on false speech are 
justified because of the specific harm they seek to prevent, like fraud and defamation.585 
He also agreed with the dissent that, in many contexts, any regulation aimed at 
prohibiting false speech would be particularly problematic, specifically “restricting false 
statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, [and] the arts.”586 After 
engaging in his balancing test, he found the Stolen Valor Act to be far too broad, because 
it would apply to statements made even in private settings and personal conversation.587  
Significantly, for our purposes, Breyer included a paragraph about the possibility 
of such a law being constructed that would attempt to limit false political speech.  
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, such a 
narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the political arena a false 
statement is more likely to make a behavioral difference (say, by leading 
the listeners to vote for the speaker) but at the same time criminal 
prosecution is particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a 
potential election result) and consequently can more easily result in 
censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the statute may have to be 
significantly narrowed in its applications. Some lower courts have upheld 
the constitutionality of roughly comparable but narrowly tailored statutes 
in political contexts. See, e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United 
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We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (C.A.2 1997) 
(upholding against First Amendment challenge application of Lanham Act 
to a political organization); Treasurer of the Committee to Elect Gerald D. 
Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich.App. 617, 389 N.W.2d 446 (1986) (upholding 
under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign material falsely 
claiming that one is an incumbent). Without expressing any view on the 
validity of those cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this 
area more accurate information will normally counteract the lie.588  
 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, voted to uphold the 
Stolen Valor Act.589 Alito argued that laws prohibiting false speech generally have “no 
intrinsic First Amendment value”.590 He argued that laws restricting false speech are only 
problematic when they “present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful 
speech.”591 He believed that the Stolen Valor Act did not present such a threat.592  
Alito acknowledged that the at times subjective nature of truth can make such 
laws particularly dangerous.  
 
Allowing the state to proscribe false statements in these areas also opens 
the door for the state to use its power for political ends. Statements about 
history illustrate this point. If some false statements about historical events 
may be banned, how certain must it be that a statement is false before the 
ban may be upheld? And who should make that calculation? While our 
cases prohibiting viewpoint discrimination would fetter the state's power 
to some degree … the potential for abuse of power in these areas is simply 
too great.593 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Id. at 2556. 
589 Id. at 2556 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
590 Id. at 2560. 
591 Id. at 2564. 
592 Id. 
593 Id. at 2565 (internal citations omitted).  
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After Alvarez, doubts remain as to whether the Supreme Court believes false 
statements can be regulated in the “marketplace of ideas”.594 Clearly any legislation 
would have to be written narrowly and deal with statements that can be objectively 
measured as true or false. Even in this circumstance, there may be members of the Court 
who feel that the risk of a chilling effect is greater than the risk that the false speech will 
distort the market, particularly given the faith of some of the Court that the market can 
correct for false statements. When considering speech as its own variable, it is clear that 




 After establishing the extremely high value placed on political speech, it may be 
surprising that there has been such a divide amongst both judges and scholars on the issue 
of corporate political speech. The divide is rarely, if ever, about the value of the speech 
itself, rather the divide is over the specific producer of the speech and how the First 
Amendment should apply when the producer is a corporation.  
The chapter on the history of corporate political speech cases discussed at length 
the varied opinions offered by the Court as to the proper treatment of corporations 
engaged in corporate political speech.595 Other than the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Rehnquist in Bellotti, none of the opinions are based on a legal theory of the corporation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 See Hasen, supra n.552; Staci Lieffring, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: 
Regulating Knowingly False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1047 (2013). 
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that would limit corporations to only those rights granted to them by an individual state 
incorporation statute.596  
Instead, most of the discussion focuses on how the “special advantages” of 
corporations allow for the accumulation of financial “war chests” which can have 
“corrosive effects” on the marketplace of ideas.597 This language first appears in Justice 
White’s dissent in Bellotti, and eventually carried the day in Austin, before being struck 
down in Citizens United.598  
In Citizens United, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented, raising several of the arguments for regulation from 
Austin, but additionally discussing the Court’s history of determining the extent of First 
Amendment protection based on the speaker’s identity.599 He points to cases where the 
speech rights of students,600 prisoners,601 members of the armed forces,602 foreigners,603 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 (“Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it 
with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, … our inquiry must seek to determine 
which constitutional protections are “incidental to its very existence.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
597 See supra n.71-234 and accompanying text. 
598 See supra n.71-234 and accompanying text. 
599 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
600 See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 
L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”). 
601 See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 
S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (“In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those 
First Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
602 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) 
(“While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the 
First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military 
mission requires a different application of those protections”). 
603 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (foreign nationals may not directly or indirectly make 
contributions or independent expenditures in connection with a U.S. election). 
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and government employees604 have been limited and had the limits upheld by the Court. 
Stevens bases at least part of his argument on “corporate personhood” grounds.  
“Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate identity tend to be less worrisome, in 
other words, because the ‘speakers’ are not natural persons, much less members of our 
political community, and the governmental interests are of the highest order.”605 He 
continued:  
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between 
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make 
enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually 
members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be 
managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in 
fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial 
resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations 
raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our 
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic 
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially 
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.606 
 
The majority responded that the examples proffered by Stevens of restrictions 
based on the speaker’s identity are united by the idea that “there are certain governmental 
functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.”607 
The political process, the government function affected by corporate political speech, 
said the majority, is not such a government function and, in fact, “it is inherent in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 See, e.g., Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 
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taking “any active part in political management or in political campaigns” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
605 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
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nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse 
sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”608  
Unlike the discussion about the value of political speech, which finds support in 
both the relevant case law and scholarly discussion, the legal academy has been much 
more divided about whether the Citizens United stance of equivocation with regard to 
corporations and individuals is prudent.609 Objections are many, and range from 
corporate theory,610 to the possibility of corruption,611 to the danger of corporate speech 
distorting the “marketplace of ideas.”612  
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609 See e.g. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. 
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Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of Political Corruption, and the Implications 
for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 359, 382 (2011) (interpreting the 
Court's decision as the “constitutionalization of political corruption”); but see Stephen E. 
Sachs, Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A Response to Professor Issacharoff, 
124 Harv. L. Rev. F. 62, 63 (Nov. 2010) 
612 Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 Ga. 
St. U. L. Rev. 989, 992 (2011); Sullivan, supra n.609; but see Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth 
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This is not an exhaustive list of the criticisms, but does reflect the most prominent 
arguments raised by critics and highlighted in case law. These three arguments vary in 
their application to corporations and, therefore, play different roles when considering the 
role of the speaker in the marketplace.  
The most frequent objection relates to corporate theory and the concept of 
extending First Amendment rights to corporations.613 This, more than any other aspect of 
Citizens United and the debate over corporate political speech, has captured the popular 
imagination, resulting in attempts to pass legislation or even a Constitutional amendment 
that would explicitly state that Constitutional guarantees are intended for natural 
persons.614  
Although this is an important debate, it is less clear how it applies to the 
marketplace of ideas. Without compelling evidence that the identity of the speaker leads 
to specific harm, the marketplace goal of truth assertion should be independent of the 
source of the ideas being considered. Stevens’ assertion that corporations are not “part of 
the political community”615 is rarely echoed in other decisions and seems inconsistent 
with the marketplace of ideas concept that seeks to allow speech to be evaluated on its 
own merits. 
At the same time, if the Court or a legislature succeeded in establishing that 
corporations are not protected by the First Amendment, then Posner’s economic calculus, 
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which determines the balance of when to suppress otherwise protected speech, would be 
irrelevant. For this reason, more attention is given to other arguments that recognize the 
First Amendment protection of corporations but maintain that suppression is appropriate 
in the context of corporate political speech.  
There are two remaining objections to unregulated corporate political speech that 
relate to the speaker’s identity. One is the risk of corruption, and the other is the risk of 
distortion. At the outset, it is necessary to explain that these are two distinct harms. 
Justice Marshall, writing in Austin, combined the two, when he stated that “Michigan's 
regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the 
corporation's political ideas.”616  
It is possible to respect the harm caused by distortion without equating it to 
corruption, a term that has traditionally been defined by the court quite differently.617  As 
commentators have pointed out, Marshall’s definition of corruption is problematic. 
This view defines corruption poorly, and makes corruption appear as a 
“derivative” problem from broader societal inequalities. As formulated in 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the only case to adopt 
squarely the distortion of electoral outcomes view of corruption, the 
inequities born of wealth are compounded by the unnatural ability of 
corporations to amass wealth more readily than can individuals. This 
argument logically extends to all disparities in electoral influence 
occasioned by differences in wealth.618 
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Corruption, as traditionally defined, was at the heart of the legislation being 
considered in Buckley, the forefather of most corporate political speech cases.619 The 
legislation applied equally to individuals and corporations, so corruption was not yet a 
concern specifically related to the speaker’s identity,620 Buckley established two ways in 
which corruption could justify suppressing otherwise protected speech.621 The first is the 
real danger of quid-pro-quo arrangements between politicians and those who would 
either contribute money directly or spend money independently to support a candidate.622 
“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from 
current and potential office holders,” said the majority, “the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined.”623 The second danger results from what would 
be termed the “appearance of corruption”. “Of almost equal concern as the danger of 
actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming 
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions.”624   
The majority in Buckley found the danger of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption compelling for limiting campaign contributions, but rejected it as a compelling 
rationale for limiting independent expenditures.625 “The absence of prearrangement and 
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent” said the Court, “not only 
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger 
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that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the 
candidate.”626 Buckley stands for the proposition that independent expenditures, 
regardless of the speaker’s identity, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance.  
The Court in Bellotti also refused to suppress political speech through 
independent expenditures based on an argument for the possibility of corruption, even 
when the restriction was limited to corporations.627 However, the legislation challenged 
in Bellotti applied only to corporate political speech about general ballot measures and 
not to candidate elections.628 As the majority noted, “The risk of corruption perceived in 
cases involving candidate elections … simply is not present in a popular vote on a public 
issue.”629 The possibility of corporate political speech leading to corruption was 
mentioned in dicta in Bellotti, when the court noted in a footnote that “Congress might 
well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in 
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”630   
In Citizens United, the majority seemed to close the door left open by the Bellotti 
footnote.631 Specifically mentioning the footnote, the Citizens United majority held that 
“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”632 The fact “[t]hat speakers may have 
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt. 
And the appearance of influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this 
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democracy.”633 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, specified “those made by 
corporations” as an aside, but spent little energy on the distinctions between corporations 
and individuals articulated by Austin and Stevens in his Citizens United dissent.  
Those distinctions, as noted above, were based on the alleged “special 
characteristics” of corporations that allow them to establish political “war chests”.634 
Stevens, in his dissent in Citizens United, as well as several subsequent commentators, 
disagree with the conclusion of the Citizens United majority, arguing that the speaker’s 
corporate identity gives special weight to the probability of corruption.635  Stevens 
asserted that corporations “are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, 
not simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and organizational 
structure.”636 According to Stevens, corporations have several features that increase the 
likelihood of actual corruption. “The unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and 
single-minded focus they bring to this effort, I believed, make quid pro quo corruption 
and its appearance inherently more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) 
spend unrestricted sums on elections.”637 
In addition to an increased risk of actual corruption, Stevens highlights the 
concerns regarding the appearance of corruption brought on by corporate political speech, 
noting that: 
A Government captured by corporate interests, [the public] may come to 
believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their 
views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and 
disenchantment: an increased perception that large spenders “‘call the 
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tune’” and a reduced “‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.’”638 
 
The anti-distortion rationale is based on concerns by some members of the Court 
who fear that economic power might be transformed into political power through the 
political marketplace. This argument has also been called the “leveling the playing-field” 
rationale, although some proponents of the rationale may believe that there is a 
distinction between leveling the playing field and limiting distortion.  
The Court has explicitly refused to recognize this rationale as a potential 
compelling interest. In a later case, the Court noted that “[t]his Court has repeatedly 
rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the 
playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”639 The majority opinion 
in Buckley had rejected this idea from the beginning, when it said that the Court had no 
interest, compelling or otherwise ,“in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.”640 Citizens United relied explicitly on this 
language.641  
Stevens maintains that the rationale in Austin that considered distortion to be a 
form of corruption, was based on an issue that Stevens maintained can be separated from 
equalization or leveling.642 That rationale was based on the “corrosive effects” of 
corporate wealth on the political system.643 According to this view, corporate wealth is 
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corrosive because corporations can amass large “war chests” because of their “special 
characteristics.”644 In this view, “[t]he majority's unwillingness to distinguish between 
corporations and humans similarly blinds it to the possibility that corporations' ‘war 
chests’ and their special ‘advantages’ in the legal realm, … may translate into special 
advantages in the market for legislation.”645 
Because of their special advantages, critics suggest that corporations may drown 
out other voices and monopolize the market for political speech.646 “[W]hen corporations 
grab up the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election,” said Stevens, “they can 
flood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or no correlation’ to the ideas of natural 
persons or to any broader notion of the public good, … The opinions of real people may 
be marginalized,”647 which may decrease the ability of individuals to weigh all ideas and 
arrive at truth.648  
According to Stevens, “Austin ' s ‘concern about corporate domination of the 
political process,’ … reflects a concern to facilitate First Amendment values by 
preserving some breathing room around the electoral ‘marketplace’ of ideas … the 
marketplace in which the actual people of this Nation determine how they will govern 
themselves.”649 Despite the language in Citizens United declaring that corporate 
expenditures on political speech do not give rise to corruption, and despite the language 
stating that “antidistortion” is not a compelling interest, the question remains whether 
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either rationale can justify the suppression of corporate political speech based on the 
speaker’s identity using the law and economics framework below. 
3. Audience 
The “marketplace of ideas” analogy puts a premium on the effect that speech has 
on others. The underlying rationale for allowing speech is that it may be of some value 
for those who hear it in allowing them to arrive at truth. Therefore, the audience (i.e. the 
“consumers” in the marketplace) are possibly the most important players when 
considering the effects of speech regulation. 
The Court has considered the audience an important variable in First Amendment 
cases in several contexts. In cases regarding incitement, for example, the Court has 
determined that the likelihood of the speech to bring about specific negative responses 
from the audience is the determining factor in whether the speech can be suppressed. In 
an early incitement case that used the clear and present danger standard, Justice Brandeis 
argued that given time, the audience could filter through harmful speech and arrive at 
truth.   
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless 
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall 
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. 
 
In other contexts, considerations about audience impact have led to more 
paternalistic practices. The Commercial Speech Doctrine, has often considered the effect 
of speech on listeners. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto 
Rico, the Court upheld a ban on casino gambling advertising that was based on the 
assumption that advertising would entice residents to gamble, proving harmful to their 
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collective “health, safety and welfare”. This concern about audience reaction to speech 
was a “substantial” interest for the government, upholding the regulation to suppress 
speech. The Court rejected the argument that the less burdensome solution to combating 
the problems associated with gambling advertising would have been to rely on the 
marketplace of ideas. The Court left it “up to the legislature to decide whether or not such 
a ‘counterspeech’ policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino 
gambling as a restriction on advertising.” 
Other commercial speech cases have also discussed the impact of the speech on 
the audience, but have followed the trust-of-audience rationality found in the traditional 
rationale for the “marketplace of ideas”. For example, in 44 Liquor Mart, Inc.: 
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural 
life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the 
ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule 
is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value 
of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of 
the First Amendment.650 
 
The Court concluded that “[p]recisely because bans against truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception 
or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will 
respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.”651 
In the corporate political speech debate, both sides invoke the rights of the 
audience as rational for either upholding or overturning limitations on corporate political 
speech. Justice Stevens, in Citizens United, argued that there must be a balance between 
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the right of the corporate speakers and the right of the audience to hear a variety of views. 
According to Stevens:  
[concern about corporate domination] reflects a concern to facilitate First 
Amendment values by preserving some breathing room around the 
electoral “marketplace” of ideas, the marketplace in which the actual 
people of this Nation determine how they will govern themselves. The 
majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that laws such as § 203 do not 
merely pit the anticorruption interest against the First Amendment, but 
also pit competing First Amendment values against each other. There are, 
to be sure, serious concerns with any effort to balance the First 
Amendment rights of speakers against the First Amendment rights of 
listeners. But when the speakers in question are not real people and when 
the appeal to “First Amendment principles” depends almost entirely on the 
listeners' perspective, it becomes necessary to consider how listeners will 
actually be affected.652 
 
On the other side of the debate, Justice Kennedy’s concern is the suppression of 
corporate political speech that would itself lead to the electorate being “deprived of 
information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.”653 According to Kennedy:  
When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, “[m]any 
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes 
risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose 
simply to abstain from protected speech—harming not only themselves 
but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas.”654 
 
Even if both sides rely at times on the assumption of rationality from the 
audience, there is a distinction in how each feels about the potential of a high volume of 
speech to allow audiences to arrive at truth. Justice Scalia sums up the position that the 
marketplace is better served by more speech by noting. “[t]he premise of our system is 
that there is no such thing as too much speech—that the people are not foolish but 
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653 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (internal citations omitted). 
654 Id. at 335 (internal citations omitted). 
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intelligent, and will separate the wheat from the chaff.”655 Stevens on the other hand, is 
concerned about the impact of high volume of speech on the market.  
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and 
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere; and if 
broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence elections apart 
from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they make any); and if 
legislators always operated with nothing less than perfect virtue; then I 
suppose the majority's premise would be sound.656 
 
A number of scholars have expressed reservations about the faith the Court has 
shown in the audience to process information and have argued that faith in the rationality 
of the audience is nothing but faith, often divorced from statistical evidence and 
psychological understanding of human behavior.657 For example, in language similar to 
that of Stevens above, Stanley contends that the audience is less capable of making 
informed decisions regarding the information in the marketplace than the model suggests.  
[R]eal world conditions...interfere with the effective operation of the 
marketplace of ideas: sophisticated and expensive communication 
technology, monopoly control of the media, access limitations suffered by 
disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation, 
irrational responses to propaganda … all conflict with marketplace 
ideals.658 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
656 Id. at 472. 
657 See e.g. Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41 Jurimetrics J. 337, 
343 (2001); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for ““Asymmetrical Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219-23 
(2003); Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions 
in the First Amendment, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (2003); Michael S. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues 
and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1141 (2003). 
658 Ingber, supra n.523 at 5. 
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Specific concerns, reflected in the statements above, include the inability of 
individuals to avoid being manipulated by messages because of framing effects,659 the 
use of heuristics and cues to make decisions in the face of bounded rationality,660 and the 
negative impact of too much information on efficient decision-making.661 Many of these 
concerns have their origin in the work of behavioral psychology and it’s impact on 
economics and law, as discussed in chapter three.662 
Scholars assert that framing can be used to manipulate public opinion, According 
to Derek Bambauer, for example, “[t]he marketplace of ideas model holds that people 
arrive at truth regardless of how it is framed or presented, but the radically different 
success of reforms of the “estate tax” and the “death tax,” … demonstrate[s] the falsity of 
this conclusion.”663 In the area of commercial speech, scholars have long argued that 
sophisticated speakers can manipulate messages to take advantage of the framing biases 
found in the average audience.664 With an economic motive to maximize return on 
investment, there are reasons to believe that political advertisements from corporations 
and others can have the same manipulating impact.665  
The idea that voters may use heuristics and cues to vote also runs contrary to 
some aspects of a rational audience assumption.666 However, some have argued that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 See supra n.481-489 and accompanying text. 
660 See supra n.497-506 and accompanying text. 
661 See Bambauer, supra n.527 at 697; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159, 1196 (2003) ; see also 
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 62, 80 (1988). 
662 See supra n.481-506 and accompanying text. 
663 See Bambauer, supra n.527 at 699. 
664 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 722-743 (1999) 
665 See Rubin, supra n.657 
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economic theory actually predicts voters will act irrationally in making political choices, 
and that their behavior is actually rational.667 Gaining information is costly, at least in 
terms of the time spent and the opportunity costs associated with that time, and the 
likelihood of a single vote deciding an issue is low.668 This has led some to refer to voter 
ignorance, or acceptance of the limits of their rationality, as “rationally irrational.”669 
Regardless of whether the ignorance is rational or not, it means that political decisions 
may be based on cues and heuristics rather than careful consideration of the merits of 
arguments.670 This cuts against the assumption of a “rational” audience who can 
efficiently process information in the marketplace of ideas to arrive at “truth.”671 
Behavioral economists have also challenged Scalia’s pronouncement that there is 
no such thing as too much speech.672 Experiments have found that additional irrelevant 
information, can influence people to change a decision.673 Assuming the new decision is 
less reflective of the true choice, the additional information leads to market 
inefficiencies.674 According to Mark Kelman, for example, “[t]he problem is not a lack of 
adequate information—it is that we cannot process the data that is already out there. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957); see 
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BAD POLICIES 94 (2007). 
668 CAPLAN, supra n.667.  
669 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885, 928 (2006)  
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Injecting additional information makes this processing problem even worse.”675 Although 
technology has greatly expanded access for speakers and opened markets to new 
information, the ability to process information has not accelerated at the same rate. As 
Bambauer notes, “We are shifting between scarcities: from scarcity of communications 
media (such as newspapers or broadcast frequencies) to scarcity of attention.”676 Both 
proponents and opponents of restrictions on corporate political speech appeal to the 
impact of such speech on the audience (or the “consumers” in the “marketplace of 
ideas”). 
The Marketplace Variables and Posner’s Free Speech Formula 
	  
Posner reformulated Learned Hand’s balancing provision created in Dennis to 
look like this: V+E < P x L/(1 + i)n.677 V represents social loss from suppressing valuable 
information. E is the legal-error costs incurred in trying to determine whether the 
information in question is valuable. P is the probability that the speech being restricted 
will result in harm and L is the magnitude of harm with a formula to adjust future harm to 
present value. 
Posner proposes that speech should be restricted only when P x L is greater than 
V+E. Having identified the variables considered by the courts and the commentators 
when discussing corporate political speech, the question is what impact to regulations of 
corporate political speech have on the “marketplace of ideas” when these variables are 
plugged into the Posner formula, as modified where appropriate by the concerns of 
behavioral law and economics.  
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1. Speech 
a. Value of Information (V)  
Courts and scholars are in agreement that political speech, as a concept, is at the 
core of First Amendment values and, therefore, any limitation of political speech will 
result in significant social harm.678 Very few of the justifications for suppressing 
corporate political speech have been predicated on the lack of value such speech adds and 
the Court has rarely considered the probability of harm to be significant enough to justify 
the suppression of truthful political speech.  
However, commentators have expressed concern that false speech is not as 
valuable.679 In other contexts, like commercial speech, the Court has agreed.680 Lower 
courts have justified upholding legislation that suppressed false political speech because 
it could lead to voters being misinformed.681 The marketplace of ideas framework would 
place a lower value on any speech that would make the discovery of truth more difficult, 
including false political speech 
b. E (Legal Error Costs) 
The only basis for limiting corporate political speech that considers the actual 
speech itself is limiting false political speech. In U.S. v. Alvarez several of the Justices 
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679 See Colin B. White, Comment, The Straight Talk Express: Yes We Can Have a False 
Political Advertising Statute, 13 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 5 (2009). 
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joined opinions that specifically expressed concern about the difficult task of crafting 
effective legislation that would address false speech while giving political debate the 
“breathing space” the Court has defended since Sullivan.682 This indicates that even when 
considering false political speech, there is reason to believe that the speech has value that 
would result in social loss if suppressed and, more importantly, there are significant legal 
error costs associated with attempting to suppress only the false speech with the least 
value and the most harm. Determining truth has traditionally been problematic for outside 
groups, and the chilling effect on speech where the truth is difficult to determine could 
lead to significantly over-inclusive regulation.  
c. L/(1 + i)n (Magnitude of harm adjusted to present value) 
The argument is rarely advanced that truthful political speech is harmful in and of 
itself. False political speech, however, can cause harm to the extent that it can confuse 
voters and mislead people. False speech in other contexts has been determined to be 
harmful enough to justify suppression, including defamatory and commercial speech. It is 
also likely that the harm caused by false speech would be imminent because political 
speech is so concentrated around times when individuals make political decisions 
d. P (Probability of harm) 
The likelihood of harm from false political speech could be impacted by the 
strength of disclosure laws that would require speakers, including corporations, to be 
associated with any false political speech they produce and the ability of the press and 
other independent groups to create accountability for producers of false speech. Although 
there are arguments that corporations are not likely to engage in false political speech 
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because it could prove negative from a public relations perspective, this would be 
dependent on the ability of the marketplace to internalize the external harm produced by 
false political speech and force the speakers to bear this cost. Whether disclosure laws 
and watchdog groups can do this efficiently is unclear and additional data about the 
amount of false speech in the marketplace could impact future calculations. 
e. Conclusion 
Applying the Posner formula to the speech itself in the case of corporate political 
speech, we can see that the Court has placed high value on political speech, even false 
political speech, and therefore, it is likely that the Court would be leery of suppressing 
such vital information. The Court would have to consider the likelihood of harm to be 
significant enough to offset the high legal error costs associated with attempting to isolate 
only that speech which is truly harmful and of low value to the public debate. Because 
Posner’s formula would rarely lead to the suppression of corporate political speech on the 
basis of the speech itself and, therefore, such regulation would need to be justified on the 
basis of increased harm brought on by either the speaker’s identity or the impact of the 
speech on the audience.  
2. Speaker 
a. V (Value) 
The first two variables will look similar to the discussion of speech above. This is 
still political speech which has been long established as having high value that would 
result in significant social loss if suppressed. An argument that political speech produced 
by corporations is likely to be of less value than other political speech is rarely 
considered by the courts. The two rationales used consistently by commentators and 
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judges for suppressing speech on the basis of corporate identity are an anti-distortion 
rationale683 and an anti-corruption rationale.684 Both of these are based on ideas distinct 
from the value of the speech itself.  
b. E (Legal Error Costs) 
The error analysis would be distinct, depending on whether you were considering 
the corruption rationale or the distortion rationale. The corruption analysis would focus 
on why corporations are being targeted. Two rationales for targeting corporations 
specifically are that more speech leads to more corruption and, therefore, if corporations 
are in a unique position to produce the most political speech, then they are the most likely 
candidates for bringing about the corresponding corruption. The second rationale is that 
corporations are more likely than other speakers to seek favorable political treatment in 
return for political speech in support of a candidate or party.  
There is disagreement over whether corporations are in a unique position to 
produce large quantities of political speech. Justices opposed to suppression of corporate 
political speech have pointed out that corporations that actually have significant political 
“war chests” are the exception and that most corporations are small and lack significant 
resources.685 Therefore, suppressing the speech of all corporations is likely to be over-
inclusive with regards to how many speakers it impacts, which is the equivalent of a legal 
error cost.  
However, it would be worth considering what percentage of corporate political 
speech comes from small corporations and what percentage comes from large 
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corporations that have access to the “war chests” that are used to justify the suppression. 
If “war chest” corporations actually “produce” the vast majority of corporate political 
speech, than the actual legal error cost is less, because the suppression of small 
corporation political speech would be more hypothetical than actual. 
When considering the increased likelihood that corporations would seek favorable 
political treatment, the courts would need to make assumptions about the motivations of 
speakers or regulate on a case-by-case basis. For the most part, the Court has been 
hesitant to consider speaker motivation. “[While] a bad motive may be deemed 
controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First 
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.”686 
In several contexts, the Court has discussed the concern that legal error is likely when 
attempting to ascertain the motive of the speaker.687  
When considering distortion, the main rationale for limiting the suppression of 
political speech by corporations is the relationship between quantity of speech and the 
distortion. There is little argument that corporate speech is more distorting in and of 
itself, separate from the quantity produced. As with corruption, any regulation based on 
the speaker’s identity is likely to be over-inclusive, as a small percentage of corporations 
are actually in the position to have a uniquely distorting effect on the market. This 
regulation could be justified if it is demonstrated that although the regulation is over-
inclusive in the number of speakers it effects, the majority of the speech that is produced 
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by corporations comes specifically from the types of corporations that are in a position to 
distort the marketplace. However, a regulation based on speaker’s identity will also be 
under-inclusive to the extent that some individuals have a significant amount of money 
that could be used to produce large amounts of political speech that has the same 
distorting effects.  
c. L/(1 + i)n (Magnitude of harm adjusted to present value) 
In Citizens United, the Court rejected both the anti-corruption and the anti-
distortion arguments as compelling interests. However, both have found favor in previous 
decisions, and the normative nature of law and economics requires that they be 
considered on their own merits.  
Evidence could be presented (and some argue has been presented) that shows that 
parties that spend significant amounts of money on political speech can extract 
preferential treatment from political actors. This would be a serious harm, and even if the 
favoritism happened in the future, the magnitude of the harm would be high enough to 
merit serious consideration. Although it is unlikely the harm itself would be more 
significant based on the speaker’s corporate identity, the corporate identity might increase 
the probability of the harm as discussed below.  
It is more difficult to establish a reason for considering the speaker’s corporate 
identity when analyzing the anti-distortion rationale. Ignoring the Court’s consistent 
rejection of any rationale that appears to be based simply on “leveling the playing field”, 
the argument would have to be based on the notion that corporate speakers are 
particularly problematic when it comes to distorting the marketplace of ideas. Most 
distortion rationale is based on the imagery of “flooding the marketplace” and “drowning 
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out” other voices. The harm would result from the information barriers created when 
speakers or listeners cannot participate in a marketplace that includes all possible 
viewpoints. This could prevent the marketplace from efficiently arriving at truth. Unlike 
the corruption harm, which is harm to the political system that does not directly detract 
from the functioning of the marketplace of ideas, the harm of distortion goes to the heart 
of the marketplace of ideas goal of efficiency in the quest for truth. 
The argument that the risk of harm is increased by the speaker’s corporate identity 
has only one possible rationale when considering distortion rather than corruption. The 
distortion argument by its nature is related to the quantity of speech produced. Evidence 
that corporations are in a unique position to produce large quantities of speech likely to 
overwhelm the marketplace and reduce the total number of ideas could be used to show a 
high probability of harm if corporations have the right to engage in unlimited political 
speech. 
d. P (Probability of harm) 
Does the speaker’s corporate identity significantly increase the probability of the 
harm of corruption? As mentioned above, there are two arguments that could be made 
that it does. The first is that the probability of corruption increases in correlation with the 
quantity of political speech. If this is true, any speaker who “produces” a significant 
amount of political speech could bring about the likely harm of corruption. If 
corporations are in a unique position to “produce” a significant amount of political 
speech, then increasing the probability of harm from corporate political speech could be 
jusfitied. This is the heart of the “special characteristics” and “war chests” language 
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accepted by several Justices and commentators and, if accepted, creates a fairly strong 
argument for repression.688 
Another possible rationale for limiting political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity would be to establish that corporate speakers are more likely to seek 
favorable treatment from politicians and therefore the danger of corruption is higher 
when the speaker is a corporation. Following this rationale, the link between corruption 
and corporate identity would not be based on the resources of the corporation relative to 
other potential speakers, but rather, based on an assumption about corporate motives and 
the likelihood corporations would seek or secure favoritism. 
e. Conclusion 
Corporations do not have a monopoly on the channels of political speech which 
would give rise to concerns. The concerns are, therefore, based on the “unique” ability of 
corporations to amass political “war chests” that lead to corruption and distortion. A 
balancing test on this basis will require very careful consideration and analysis of actual 
production of corporate political speech in the marketplace in order to avoid high legal-
error costs and the chilling of otherwise valuable speech. 
To avoid high legal-error costs in the formula, regulations would need to be 
drawn to avoid suppressing the speech of small corporations and to include wealthy 
individuals because the rationale of corruption and distortion are both reliant on the 
ability to produce a large quantity of speech. Such regulation ceases to be limited to 
corporations and is distinct from any corporate political speech regulation previously 
accepted by the Court. This type of limitation seems very similar to the “leveling the 
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playing field” argument that the Court has consistently rejected. If a regulation were only 
aimed at corporations, one would need to show a large probability of significant harm in 
order to balance the high legal-error cost of an over/under inclusive regulation. 
3. Audience 
a. V 
The value of political speech to the audience is in the fact that more political 
speech will allow consumers to make informed political decisions by weighing all sides 
of an issue. This is why political speech has been held consistently to be of high value.  
However, the value of the speech to the audience is based on the assumption that 
the members of the audience are rational consumers of information who can use political 
speech efficiently to arrive at “true” or “correct” decisions. The two possible audience-
based restrictions that have been reflected in both case law and commentary are: 1) 
suppressing speech that is aimed at misleading an audience that is predictably irrational 
in certain respect with regards to the way messages are framed; 2) suppressing speech in 
an effort to avoid “flooding” the market, which, if it occurs, will increase the use of 
heuristics and limit the efficiency of information processing.  
The first argument would be predicated on the idea that speech that seeks to 
manipulate audience psychology can be deemed to be less valuable. The problem with 
this is that the Court has been skeptical of regulations aimed at speech because it is likely 
to be effective in influencing voter conduct. “To be sure, corporate advertising may 
influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy 
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may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution ‘protects 
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.”689  
It is unclear whether the evidence from behavioral economics is strong enough to 
contradict the assumptions from Bellotti and other cases that persuasive speech is 
effective, but not manipulative. If clear data suggest that people can be manipulated by 
particular framing methods, speech using these methods arguably could have less value 
to the consumers in the marketplace of ideas.   
If the evidence that additional information can reduce efficient decision making is 
accepted, the social loss from suppressing political speech would also be lessened if it 
could be demonstrated that the speech was already represented in the marketplace, and 
that the additional information was redundant or superfluous. Speech that is clearly 
“irrelevant” could be limited with little social loss. The challenge would come in limiting 
regulation to just this type of speech, as discussed below in legal error costs.  
b. E 
One consideration for regulation that seeks to suppress speech because it could 
manipulate audience irrationality is the ability of regulators to create legislation that 
would effectively target only the problematic speech without chilling or suppressing 
otherwise valuable political speech. In the context of corporate political speech, this is the 
heart of Justice Kennedy’s concern regarding speakers who choose not to speak rather 
than risk being considered in violation of a regulation on a case-by-case basis.690 It seems 
likely that regulation aimed at either improper framing methods or meant to limit 
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redundant or irrelevant speech could have significant legal error costs to add to the social 
loss from suppressing political speech.  
Both potential limitations based on the impact of speech on the audience would 
have to overcome an additional factor related to legal error. To the extent that human 
beings are consistently irrational in predictable ways, there is no reason to assume that 
legislators or judges would not be equally prone to errors. In fact, experiments on the 
impact of irrational biases on decision making have found that “[c]ompared to other 
actors, judges were just as susceptible to anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric 
bias”.691  
In an article that advocated for regulations that would consider the impact of 
information on irrational audiences, the principle example was the information provided 
by the Bush administration in justification of the invasion of Iraq.692 Although this may 
have been an effective example of the biases that can lead individuals to irrational 
conclusions when processing information, it does not support government intervention to 
limit information and avoid the bias. To the contrary, the misleading information that led 
to the arguably irrational decision was being supplied by the government and the only 
reason the conclusions of the population can be identified as irrational in hindsight is 
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because of the large quantity of competing information that questioned the governments 
evidence.   
These are two examples that lead to the conclusion that legal error costs of 
attempting to suppress speech in an attempt to facilitate rational decisions could be 
prohibitively high. At a minimum, the corresponding probability of harm would need to 
be extremely high to justify the suppression of speech in this context. 
c. L 
The marketplace of ideas framework may allow for more leeway in justifying 
suppression because the harm can be measured in terms of the impact on the ability of the 
“buyers” in the marketplace to arrive at true ideas. The harm would come from either 
manipulating the irrationality of the audience through framing or by harming the 
efficiency of the marketplace through excessive information that is either redundant or 
irrelevant.  
In the first instance, the harm of such speech would be that it would manipulate 
audience members by anticipating the ways in which they would react irrationally and 
tailoring messages to take advantage of this. Basically it is the reverse of the positive 
manipulation advocated by Thaler and Sunstein in their popular book on behavioral law 
and economics.693 This would be harmful, if it prevented the efficient working of the 
marketplace. And the harm would be imminent to the extent it was used to influence 
voting behavior in the time leading up to elections and other political decisions. 
In the second instance, the harm of the speech would be that it would prevent 
efficient decision making by creating information barriers that could prevent consumers 
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from getting the information they require for political decisions. In the same way that 
holding relevant information back can lead to inefficient decisions, burying relevant 
information in a mass of irrelevant speech could create a lack of perfect information that 
the marketplace of ideas strives for when operating at peak efficiency.  
d. P 
Evidence from behavioral law and economics is largely tangential to actual 
political decision-making and the impact of political speech. However, the findings of 
behavioral economists may be generalized to electoral decision-making and provide some 
hard evidence that actual inefficiencies are likely to be created by messages framed to 
take advantage of irrational decision making and by high quantities of speech that raise 
information barriers that limit the ability of consumers to find relevant information.  
Some critics have argued that the irrational behavior that has been consistently 
demonstrated in experiments has not been established in real world conditions.694 This is 
worth noting, but there are two counter arguments. The first is that the argument is 
premised on the idea that people have stronger motivations to avoid irrational decisions 
outside the controlled environment of an experiment. However, as mentioned above, 
there is some evidence that the motivation of voters to become informed about political 
decisions is also low so it is possible the experimental results would be consistent with 
real world decision making with low motivation.695  
The second counter argument is the more general observation that there is irony in 
questioning the quantitative data used to justify behavioral research when so much of the 
underlying logic for law and economics is based on assumptions about behavior and 
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theory rather than data. Strong data about actual human decision-making are relevant 
because the logic of applying economic theory to law is based on the superior ability of 
economics to comply with human decision making. If there is actual data demonstrating 
that the findings of irrationality by behavioral economists are incorrect, this finding could 
be considered in future weighing of speech regulations.   
e. Conclusion 
For the marketplace of ideas to function, there must be an audience that receives 
the ideas and processes them. As Justice Brennen put it, “It would be a barren 
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”696 Any decision about whether 
to allow regulation that impacts speakers and suppresses speech, must consider the 
impact, positive or negative, on the audience for that speech.  
In other contexts, scholars have advocated for understanding the limits of 
rationality and then adjusting regulations and legislation to best position people to make 
rational decisions.697 This idea is more complicated if regulations would result in the 
infringements of a First Amendment right. The high legal error costs associated with 
attempting to craft legislation that suppresses problematic or excessive information is 
particularly problematic when there is little reason to assume that legislators or judges are 
any better at avoiding the problematic irrational behavior than the rest of the consumers 
in the marketplace of ideas.  
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Conclusion 
	  
Law and economics does not necessarily lead to the simple conclusion advocated 
in some judicial decisions that more speech is always better. In certain circumstances, 
this approach suggests it is appropriate to suppress speech because the high probability of 
significant and imminent harm outweigh the loss of valuable speech. This is consistent 
with most understandings of the value of free speech from Mill to Holmes, Jr.. But one of 
the most important aspects of Posner’s balancing test is the explicit calculation of legal 
error costs.  
In almost every instance above, the high likelihood of legal error brought about by 
trying to target only specific speech that is deemed problematic, while allowing valuable 
political speech to reach the marketplace, leads to a conclusion that efficient regulation is 
difficult if not impossible. For this reason, regulation of corporate political speech is 
unlikely to be justified because the valuable loss of information and the error costs 
associated with such regulation will outweigh the benefits of keeping some harmful 
speech from the marketplace.  
One does not need Posner’s formula for this realization. Almost every First 
Amendment case balances the need to suppress the speech with the possibility of a 
limitation being either too broad or too narrow. The chilling effect of legislation is an 
excellent example of an economic externality, and the likelihood that a restriction would 
end up suppressing too much speech has long been the best rationale for striking down 
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regulations on First Amendment grounds. But applying the law and economics 
methodology and viewing the regulation through the marketplace of ideas framework 
show that legal error is consistently a problem when trying to justify suppression based 
on the speech, the speaker, or the audience.  
Although on each individual level, the legal error cost seems to make justifying 
regulation difficult, an argument can be made that isolating the variables downplays the 
significant of the problem. After all, past regulations were not based just on the speech, or 
the speaker, or the audience, but on a combination of all three. When the harm brought a 
about by potentially false political speech, made by speakers with a unique ability to 
bring about corruption, and the high likelihood of distortion, leading to irrational 
decisions and inefficient political action is considered, this combination perhaps increases 
the harm to a level where it could outweigh the suppression of valuable speech. The 
problem is that combining the variables does not simply multiply the harm; it also 
multiplies the legal error. In order to avoid being over-inclusive, the regulation would 
now needs to target the problematic speech, from the problematic speaker, that has the 
negative effect, all without including or chilling other valuable speech valuable to the  
marketplace of ideas.  
As insights from behavioral economics and other places continue to add to the 
understanding of consumer behavior in the marketplace of ideas, it is important to revisit 
assumptions and update calculations. However, paternalistic regulations aimed at 
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improving decision-making will always have to overcome the criticism that the regulators 
are no less irrational than the audience they are trying to protect.  
Although the overall conclusion from the application of the Posner balancing test 
to regulation of corporate political speech is that such regulation is not justified, this 
could change with additional evidence. An increase in false political speech would reduce 
the value of the speech. Additional evidence of corruption would increase the harm 
produced by such speech. So would additional information about individual decision-
making that demonstrates that corporate political speech is uniquely likely to lead to 
irrational political choices and inefficient political decision-making. Some justices have 
argued that the regulation of corporate political speech is not dependent on the presence 
or absence of quantitative evidence attempting to prove corruption or distortion, but 
rather on a law and economics approach that considers such evidence relevant to the 
weight given specific variables. 
Regardless of whether the Court ever explicitly adopts a law and economics 
framework, it is likely that courts in future corporate political speech cases will continue 
to weigh the variables identified in this dissertation and attempt to balance the harm 
brought about by such speech against the loss of valuable speech brought about through 
suppression. This dissertation makes clear that the legal error costs of attempting to target 
specific speech without being over or under-inclusive should and likely will always play 
a prominent role in the future consideration of corporate political speech issues. 
Additionally, it is clear that there are arguments within the existing rationale accepted by 
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the courts for protecting and suppressing corporate political speech, but that future cases 
should be centered on evidence of actual behavior by both corporate speakers and 
audience members that allow for an appropriate valuation of both the speech and the 
harm. Arguments about the extension of First Amendment protections to corporations 
and distinct legal standing of corporations should be replaced by more specific arguments 
about the actual impacts of corporate political speech on the marketplace of ideas and the 
ability of regulation to lead to more efficient results for all involved.   
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